

**Corrections and Comments on Herken, Counsels of War
June 11, 1986**

p. 218: "Friends said they had begun to notice an apparent change of heart concerning the war on Ellsberg's part shortly after his return from a 1967 tour of Vietnam for the Pentagon and Rand.¹ Engaged in a study of Vietcong motivation for Rand, Ellsberg had been particularly impressed with the evidence of the enemy's dedication and morale.² A marine reservist,³ Ellsberg had come back from the front with both his optimism about the war and his health undermined. "They don't call it a 'jaundiced view' for nothing," observed Thomas Schelling about this period of growing disillusionment in his Rand colleague's life."⁴

CORRECTIONS:

1. I made no "1967 tour of Vietnam for the Pentagon and Rand," nor did I work for either of those agencies while I was in Vietnam in the mid-60's. I served in Vietnam from mid-1965 to mid-1967 working for the State Department; I transferred from the DOD to State before leaving for Vietnam in the summer of 1965.

2. I did no study of Vietcong motivation, for Rand or anyone else. Rand did such a study for the DOD; I had no part in it. (Tony Russo did, however, and his attitudes were indeed affected by it; perhaps that is the source of this reference). My opinions were influenced by a hundred factors in Vietnam, but not particularly by the Rand study (whose major findings were known to me in the DOD by early 1965, before I left for Vietnam), or by any special knowledge of VC morale (which is scarcely mentioned in my book on Vietnam, Papers on the War).

3. My status as a Marine reservist terminated sometime around 1961 (my active duty was from 1954-57, and I was on inactive reserve for a few years after that), i.e., years before I went to Vietnam.

4. Schelling's comment refers to the fact that my "ill health" was, specifically, hepatitis--i.e., "jaundice"--which led to my return to the States in 1967. But whatever Schelling or other friends who had not seen me since 1965 may have thought, my 1967 illness had nothing to do with my disillusionment, which had been high and fairly constant for about a year before that. Most of my illusions had been sharply challenged within weeks and months of my arrival in the fall of 1965, and my remaining tentative hopes were dashed, never to return, during the second Buddhist crisis in the late spring of 1966. From the fall of 1966 my memos, reports and briefings were uncompromisingly pessimistic.

p. 218: "Before going to Vietnam, Ellsberg had participated in a Harvard debate on the war with faculty member Samuel Huntington, 5 an originator and steadfast proponent of counterinsurgency doctrine. 6 On that occasion Ellsberg had argued for a military victory in the war, 7 whereas Huntington had counseled that success in Vietnam depended upon winning over the hearts and minds of the people. 8 'Their analyses were almost identical,' Schelling recalled. 9 Except that they came out on opposite sides.'"

"While in Vietnam--according to another of his former colleagues at Harvard--Ellsberg wrote to Huntington conceding that the latter had been right in the debate. 10 By the time Ellsberg returned to the United States, the earlier positions of the two debaters were exactly reversed."

"...Ellsberg underwent 'a psychological as well as an intellectual conversion' on the war because of his experiences, former colleague 12 Stanley Hoffmann believed. An important step in that conversion, Ellsberg himself claimed, had been his subsequent involvement as director of a Rand study of the military options available to the United States in Vietnam" 13 (p. 219)

CORRECTIONS:

5. I never debated Sam Huntington before going to Vietnam. In the late spring of 1965, before I went to Vietnam, I debated Stanley Hoffmann at Harvard, whose views were obviously very different from Huntington's (at least, after 1966 or so. I'm not aware what Huntington's views were in 1965, or whether he had firm views at that time; he was not a prominent participant in the teach-ins or public controversy in 1965. But judging by his later published views, I doubt that we would have been in any particular disagreement in 1965).

6. Huntington was never in any sense an originator of counterinsurgency doctrine (nor, I'm sure, would he claim to be).

7. I never, on any occasion, before or during my tour in Vietnam, argued for a military victory in Vietnam, nor believed for a moment that that was possible nor that attempting it was desirable.

8. So far as I know, Huntington never emphasized the aim of winning hearts and minds of the people in Vietnam (he later praised the efficacy, retrospectively, of having driven much of the population--potential support for the VC--out of the countryside into the cities by massive firepower: "forced draft modernization": a policy with which I disagreed, and indeed, found abhorrent, while I was in Vietnam, well before Huntington had labelled it approvingly).

Nor did Hoffmann, in 1965 or later, urge any US attempt to win hearts and minds in Vietnam. It was I who --quixotically--believed it important to attempt that, as of mid-1965; that was why I volunteered to join Gen. Lansdale's team, Lansdale being the most prominent advocate of a political approach to the war rather than a primarily military one. (I was particularly attracted to Lansdale because he was a public critic, in an article in Foreign Affairs, of the bombing practices which Huntington later applauded).

9. Schelling's comment seems inscrutable in your account, since you report no point of agreement between the debaters (actually, Hoffmann and me) at all. What Schelling was referring to was that each of us took an understated, unrheterical, narrowly-defined position that involved agreeing--at least, for purposes of discussion--with the other on a number of propositions that were generally in hot debate in public. Hoffmann began by "conceding" or "stipulating to" a whole series of Administration propositions that were usually sharply challenged or rejected by critics of Administration policy: e.g., that the Vietcong were communist-led, directed by Hanoi, significantly supplied and reinforced from the North, that denial of US involvement and expanded combat role would result in a communist victory, and that this would incur significant penalties on US prestige and influence elsewhere in the world. Since each of these points had been a major focus of argument in earlier teach-ins in which I had participated, I began my rejoinder by admitting: "Professor Hoffmann has taken a very disarming approach: and he has nearly disarmed me."

What remained to discuss was just one, very crucial point. Hoffmann said, in substance (with supporting reasoning): "The fact is that the US is not going to succeed in Vietnam, in any sense. So it should cut its losses now and withdraw from the situation, rather than do so after years of escalating warfare." (Questions that Noam Chomsky raised, of whether the US had a legal or moral right to intervene violently or escalate in Vietnam, were not addressed, as far as I can recall, by either of us on this occasion).

I responded by saying that Hoffmann might very well be right; there was much evidence to support his position, and I could not prove him wrong. Indeed, the odds strongly favored his position. (I think the extent of my concessions--I was a GS-18 Pentagon employee at the time--was as surprising to my audience and to Hoffmann as Hoffmann's were to me). But it was not certain that he was right: that it was "impossible" for the US to achieve any useful goals by intervening in Vietnam. In view of (it seemed to me) the inescapable uncertainties involved, and in view of the stakes as he himself defined them, I felt (along with the Administration) that it was important to try to achieve a very limited, though costly, goal in Vietnam: to block communist-led insurgents from inflicting a military defeat on allied forces

that the US had trained and equipped. That involved, by the spring of 1965, direct military involvement of US forces in a war in which the US had already, rightly or wrongly, committed its prestige heavily. In short, the war was ultimately a political conflict that could not be won, by us, militarily; but in the existing political and military context of early 1965, it was clear that it could be lost, by us, militarily, and that in fairly short order if we did not escalate our involvement. That could be averted, in the short-run; and in light of US global interests, as I (mistakenly) weighed them, I supported doing so.

To go beyond that minimum goal--averting the clear-cut military defeat of US-supported forces that otherwise impended by that time--would depend on political aims, strategy and tactics which the US admittedly had yet to discover or learn how to implement. Yet that too, I thought, was worth trying, for some limited period; I recall saying, "It seems better to try to learn how to compete effectively with communist-led insurgencies right now, working alongside allied forces in Vietnam, rather than later, elsewhere, after US-supported forces had been militarily defeated in Vietnam."

(In retrospect, and with information newly available--see Larry Berman's "Planning a Tragedy"--it is clear that Lyndon Johnson's goals were far more ambitious than this, understandably so, by the time he made an open-ended troop commitment in mid-July 1965. But I was not alone in the government--see the views of John McNaughton and, at this time, William Bundy--in supporting a limited combat involvement on this narrow and provisional basis: foolish as it was, of course, to imagine that a war machine could be held down to such limited goals).

10. I did not write to Hoffmann (nor to Huntington) while I was in Vietnam, or later. I did say to Hoffmann in person, more than once, after I returned from Vietnam, that his judgment had been right, and mine wrong, in 1965. (Hoffmann did not change his position after that, nor did Huntington, as the text suggests; Huntington's position after 1966 was very different from that stated in the text, but so far as I know it always had been).

11. A tiny point, but one which bears on your attribution of sources and on the confusion in the text as to my status and employer at various times, is your use of the word "colleague," which to me suggests either a common employer or mutual membership in some team or organization. In this sense I doubt that your source is rightly described as a "former colleague at Harvard" (unless in the Society of Fellows, 1956-59) since I was never employed there (after a teaching fellowship in 1953-54).

12. Likewise (see above) Stanley Hoffmann was never a "former colleague." Nor is he a very good source on my conversion, since I have met him, altogether, less than a handful of times, very briefly, the longest probably being the 1965 debate discussed in the preceding paragraphs of your text. (Ironically, he was obviously not consulted about that one occasion--since I presume he would not have misidentified himself as Huntington or gotten out respective positions all wrong!)

13. The Rand study I directed (for Henry Kissinger in the White House) on Vietnam options played no part at all in my intellectual or psychological conversion, nor have I ever claimed it did.

Looking again at this passage of 13 sentences on pp. 218-19, I note factual errors, most of them reasonably significant, in 11 of the sentences. Not that any of them matter particularly, either to the substance of the book, or to me; it's just that it's all wrong. To repeat: I didn't give the long account of my debate with Hoffmann above because I expect you to summarize it in your new edition, or because I care personally that it was wrongly presented here; your (garbled) account doesn't bother me at all, even to have it in print, and the corrected account doesn't have any strong relevance to your thesis. I go into it here simply to point up sharply the degree to which your account is garbled, and the way this fits into a dismayingly consistent pattern of inaccuracy. As I indicate in my cover letter, the point I would like to bring home to you, here and below, is that a reader who is aware of this pattern of error in those passages where he has personal knowledge cannot help but extrapolate that pattern to the rest of the book; it would simply be unreasonable not to. I am going into such detail in hopes that this will serve you constructively as a warning about the book in its present state: a warning that others that you ask for corrections may not take the time and effort to give you.

It is not only the density and high proportion of error that is striking--almost unique in my experience --but the baffling relation, or lack of relation, to reference material, including surely your own tapes and notes from interviews. Thus, as noted above, Hoffmann is cited in the very next paragraph after a totally garbled account of an episode in which I am sure he would have been an accurate source. Presumably your actual source was Schelling, whose memory was strikingly inaccurate if you have correctly quoted him: but, obviously, that is very much in question.

The facts on my tour in Vietnam--e.g., who I was working for and when I was there--are not very esoteric; they are in Who's Who and are on the back cover of my book, *Papers on the War*. What I learned in Vietnam that changed my thinking is not only covered extensively in the Introduction to that book and other chapters, but is summarized quite accurately in pages 32-35 of Peter Schrag's book, *Test of Loyalty*. This is noteworthy because just four pages after your passage cited above, on p. 223, you give a footnote citation to p. 32 of Schrag's book! In fact, in an earlier footnote (p. 362, footnote 6 from p. 143) you actually cite this precise section from Schrag's book (pp. 11-35) as your reference "on Ellsberg's early career." I'm baffled; how could you have cited a passage in Schrag that describes correctly both the facts of my tour and its effects on me and proceeded to get these fairly well-known facts all wrong in your own account?

But then, let's look at the Schrag citation on your p. 223. It is attached to the following alleged quotation: "'Vietnam,' Ellsberg himself observed, 'destroyed the center.'" The citation is to page 32 of Schrag's book. But that quotation does not occur on page 32, nor on the surrounding pages. Indeed, I am pretty sure it does not occur in Schrag's book, nor am I aware of any other source for it: do you have, in fact, any source for that statement? I ask, because I do not believe I ever said it; I don't agree with it, and don't believe I ever did.

The footnote citation may simply have been misplaced; perhaps it should have been attached to the preceding sentence, which is a correct quote from Schrag's page 32. (That leaves the question of the source of my alleged quote). But a much more serious point remains. I am extremely pained to find myself misdescribed, one sentence earlier, as having been "the first to make an academic case for the strategy of torture and coercion," a case that raises "a particular irony" in that I, supposedly much later, "came to identify most closely with the tortured and coerced victims of the war near its end." (p. 223, underlining added).

Once again, the relation of this statement to source material is baffling. On the page of Schrag's book following the statement you cite (i.e., on Schrag's page 33) is the correct statement: "[Ellsberg] recalled how he had reacted to French practices in Algeria in the late fifties--i.e., the use of napalm on civilians and the common resort to torture: 'I told myself at the time that I'm glad that I, as an American, don't have to read this about my own country in the newspapers. And I sympathized with French critics like Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir who were resisting in their own country.'" This reaction, at the time of the events, was obviously not only long before I went to Vietnam, but before the 1959 lectures on the Art of Coercion to which you are attributing my supposed "case" for torture.

Let's turn to your earlier account of these lectures (your p. 143).

HERKEN: "When Ellsberg returned to his alma mater, Harvard, some years after graduation¹⁴ to give a Rand-sponsored lecture¹⁵ entitled "The Art of Coercion,"¹⁶ one of his former professors thought that in the talk Ellsberg had elevated torture to a principle of statecraft.¹⁷ Another lecture by Ellsberg, "The Political Uses of Madness," made an equally inventive--and chilling--point by arguing the advantages of irrationality in diplomacy, especially when threatening the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁸"

CORRECTIONS:

14. The lectures in question were given in 1959 while I was a graduate student at Harvard, in the Society of Fellows, where I had been for the preceding two years.

15. Rand had nothing to do with them; the lectures were sponsored by the Lowell Institute of Boston.

16. No lecture had the title, "The Art of Coercion." This was the title of the lecture series as a whole (six lectures).

17. I question whether any former professor of mine made this statement, or anyone who actually heard or read the lectures; if anyone did, he was a fool.

Sy Hersh gets it right in his *The Price of Power* (p. 53): "In his Harvard lectures, Ellsberg cited as his main example Hitler's conscious use of his reputation as a madman to win victories without firing a shot in the Rhineland, Austria, and Munich before World II. As his model of Hitler indicated, Ellsberg regarded such a strategy as reckless and utterly dangerous for the world, but a possibility to be anticipated from opponents because, in connection with a nuclear threat, it might work. 'I didn't even imagine that an American president could consider such a strategy,' Ellsberg says."

18. This is obviously the lecture already in question, not "another lecture." It has not been published, though I have made copies available to readers who have seen it cited in Schelling's work and elsewhere. But your footnote reference (6) is to my published article,, "The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choice," which was based on a quite different lecture from the series and has nothing at all to do with the point discussed in your text.

If one theme runs through my political life from its very beginning, it is an absolute, uncompromising opposition to torture and massacre under any circumstances whatever--my long campaign against nuclear weapons rests in particular on their character as inevitably instruments of indiscriminate massacre--and to be identified as ever having been a proponent of torture in any form or as being a late convert to resistance to it is (however unintentionally) a slander that could hardly be more agonizing to me.

I don't mean to exaggerate the impact that a published misstatement like this could have on reputation at this point in my peculiar career; but I won't hide the fact that this particular error--unlike those mentioned earlier, or the missile gap issue below--does cause me personal pain. That is also true of a similar one, on p. 170, relating to first use of nuclear weapons:

"McNamara's conversion on nuclear strategy [away from no-cities and counterforce] in turn affected the attitudes of those who had come to Washington from Rand, including some of the earliest advocates of no-cities and counterforce. By the end of

the Kennedy administration, Daniel Ellsberg had begun to ridicule the assumption that he said previously formed 'the absolute core of the strategists' mutual identity': 'We all agreed that we must be willing to blow up the western hemisphere if Russian troops crossed the borders of Germany.'"

I never agreed to that insane proposition--or the official policy and preparations based on it--for a moment, either publicly or privately, at any time in my life: not before or at the onset of the Kennedy administration any more than I do at present. Nor did McNamara's "conversion" affect my attitude on this point at all. (There has been no change at all in my opinions, or the strength of my feeling, on this issue).

(It is relevant to your overall discussion to add that my own--fairly important--role in writing the no-cities notion into the guidance for the war plans did not at all reflect a desire to enhance the credibility of first-use threats nor to achieve a war-winning capability. It reflected my desire to reduce global damage--not just to the US but very definitely to the Soviet and Chinese population--in the event of any US strike, whether first or second; and my desire--very imperfectly achieved!--to move my country away from genocidal plans and preparations.)

In my personal rejection of first-use threats, planning and policy (even while I was working on guidance for general war planning in 1961) I was not alone in my attitude among the strategists; but most of us who rejected this first-use policy did so privately, in our own hearts and in discussions among ourselves, without challenging publicly the Eastern establishment Atlanticist/NATO consensus in favor of first-use policy. That doesn't mean we/I espoused that consensus view openly; we kept our mouths shut on that subject, unless we knew who we were talking to. I won't defend that silence now, although it was indeed circumspect, an effective condition of one's involvement and access.

The only ones I recall supporting a no-first-use policy publicly and explicitly were Malcolm Hoag and Mort Halperin; but my views did not differ from theirs, though I was persuaded in 1961 that for the US to adopt a no-first-use policy explicitly would raise too high a risk that Germany would move toward acquiring nuclear weapons of its own. My attitude on this, or on related matters, underwent no change near "the end of the Kennedy administration." On the question of explicit, US declaratory policy, I did not take a new personal, public position espousing no-first use till long after the Kennedy administration, when I came back to these issues in the mid-'70's.

Once more on use of sources:

HERKEN: (footnote 9, p. 368): "The idea that appearing irrational could be an advantage in international diplomacy had also been argued by Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas Schelling. One of President Nixon's aides, H.R. Haldeman, claims that a practical demonstration of this ploy was behind Nixon's to order the bombing of the Vietnamese cities of Hanoi and Haiphong on Christmas Eve in 1972.¹⁹ See Haldeman, *The Ends of Power*, pp. 83-85."

CORRECTION:

19. Haldeman doesn't refer at all to the 1972 bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in pages cited, nor anywhere in connection with the "Madman Theory" (pp. 82-85, 98-100); the only reference to this I find (p. 94) is in a quite different context (Kissinger's habit of leaking the impression that he was a dove). Haldeman's discussion of the "Madman Theory" refers explicitly only to threats and escalations in 1969 and 1970. (I, not Haldeman, have publicly applied the concept to Nixon's bombing and threats of escalation in 1972).

The Missile Gap

HERKEN: (p. 140): "Conclusive evidence that there was no gap--or rather, that the gap entirely favored America--was forthcoming within days of Kennedy's election. Analysis of photographs taken by the Discoverer satellite launched that November confirmed Russia's vaunted missile superiority as purely illusory....Called into the Oval Office to present the incontrovertible evidence against the gap, Wiesner was somewhat surprised at Kennedy's reaction. The President had greeted the news with a single expletive--delivered, Wiesner said, more in anger than relief.²⁰

"There had been a mixed reaction at Rand as well to the truth about the missile gap. The existence of the overhead reconnaissance program came as a revelation to most of those at the think tank, to which the newly installed administration had already turned in recruiting defense experts critical of the policies of the Eisenhower administration.²¹ One of that select number, Daniel Ellsberg, eagerly accepted an invitation to join the Kennedy administration but delayed his departure for Washington in order to complete a project underway at Rand.²² It was shortly after he had arrived in the capital²³ that Ellsberg learned from another Rand alumnus in the Pentagon²⁴ the secret that few back at Santa Monica knew.

(p. 141)"...When a former colleague from Rand²⁴ violated security regulations to show him the photographs taken by the Discoverer, Ellsberg was 'stunned,' he said, by what the pictures showed."²⁵

"...Intent upon acquainting those at Rand of the surprising truth behind the missile gap--but at the same time reluctant to violate his secrecy pledge by letting them know the source of his knowledge--Ellsberg arranged a mock briefing..."²⁶

((p. 142) "...Another Kennedy recruit, Morton Halperin, had gone to Rand directly from Yale, but remained there only a year before joining McNamara's staff at the Pentagon.²⁷ Halperin became immediately aware of the tension between the insiders and the outsiders of Rand. He thought that tension had been almost palpable during a government-sponsored conference on limited war held at Princeton in the fall of 1961.²⁸ Halperin remembered the delegation from Rand had been 'startled' by his confirmation that the missile gap was illusory²⁹--a fact already so well established in the Pentagon by then, Ellsberg said, that it was increasingly difficult for the initiates 'to hide their degree of boredom' with their former colleagues."³⁰

CORRECTIONS:

20. The early Discoverer photos were far from conclusive; they covered only a portion of the suspected ICBM sites in the Soviet Union. It was not only late August (thus, after the Vienna Summit, after the June annual National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet Strategic Forces, after the Berlin crisis had heated up,

Kennedy had mobilized, and even after the Berlin Wall had been erected, that the Discoverer coverage was adequate to sustain a conclusion, to which the Intelligence Community (including the AirForce, but not yet SAC Intelligence until somewhat later) agreed, that the Soviets had less than an Initial Operational Capability (i.e., less than 10 ICBMs).

Presumably Wiesner is your reference here; but--if you quote him accurately--the word "conclusive" is in no way justified here and is misleading, whatever Wiesner's own inferences, and even the President's, may have been from the preliminary, partial evidence available from early Discoverer photos in the early months of the Administration. The fact is that the official NIE in June still estimated that the Soviets had at that time a significant superiority (as I recall, between 120 and 160 ICBMs, to the US' 40) and projected a still greater gap for the future; it was the last NIE to do so. It was not till September that a Special National Intelligence Estimate laid the missile gap to rest, on the basis of "conclusive" evidence as of August. (All this has been covered in detail in other accounts, by Ball, Kaplan, and studies of the reconnaissance program).

21. In the early months of the Administration, to which you refer here, Rand had no reaction either to the end of the missile gap nor to the existence of the satellite reconnaissance program. Except for the handful of people with special clearances (which did not include me till much later, though I learned about it through a "security breach" which I did not emulate, in the fall of 1961) Rand employees knew nothing about the satellite program anytime in the early '60's. As for the overhead reconnaissance program in general, they were surprised when they first heard of it, but that was in the spring of 1960, when the U2 was shot down. Rand knew nothing of the growing (negative) evidence against the missile gap during 1961 until my Top Secret briefing in the fall of 1961 (see below).

22. I did not join the Kennedy Administration in 1961, nor do I recall being formally invited (though I could undoubtedly have joined if I had wanted, via my colleagues who did join). I was immediately invited to be a consultant from Rand, and did so; my consulting started on the first workday after the Inauguration, not after a delay (I briefed Paul Nitze on the war plans at length on that day). (This last point is unimportant, of course; I just don't know where the allegation in the text comes from).

23,24. It was not till September, 1961 that I--or the President, or anyone else--learned the new conclusion of the intelligence community that the missile gap favored the US. I learned that from the new SNIE (which was not available to Rand), in the Pentagon. I learned the basis of the new estimate--the Discoverer photos--from inadvertent disclosures by two officials, one

civilian and one military, neither of whom were Rand alumni. (I am not trying falsely to protect Rowen, Enthoven, Hitch, et al here; this is simply a fact, and I've never said otherwise. Again, I don't know where your statement comes from, other than perhaps your own mistaken inference.)

25. My two sources on the satellite program did not show me photographs from the Discoverer--and I have never said they did--and I never saw such photographs till I had the special clearances much later. What "stunned" me--in September--was simply the new estimate in the SNIE, which was not accompanied by photos (the SNIE was only Top Secret).

26. I had made no secrecy pledge to the people who acquainted me with the Discoverer findings: it was evident to me that they had made inadvertent disclosures based on higher clearances, and I was sufficiently versed in the security system not to endanger them or the "higher" secrets not to repeat to anyone what I had learned. My briefing at Rand was not a "mock" briefing but a genuine Top Secret briefing (a rarity at Rand: it meant each person attending had to be checked in and attendance noted by a guard), where I presented the findings of the SNIE (not the Discoverer aspect, which was not alluded to in the SNIE, the SNIE itself not being formally available to Rand, since contractors had been cut off from official access to NIEs since 1958).

27. (Here and in the next three notes I depart from your request to limit my comments to references to me personally. The reference to the conference, which I attended, struck me as off so I just checked the passage with Mort Halperin by phone, with the following results: which, not surprisingly, suggest that your problems with factual accuracy are not limited to references to me). Halperin was never a Rand employee. He did not join the Pentagon--ISA--until 1966. (He did become a consultant to Rand, while still at Yale, in 1960, and he became a consultant to ISA sometime in 1961 or 1962).

28. The conference in question, in the fall of 1961, was in Washington, not Princeton (Klaus Knorr, who organized it, was from Princeton). It was not on "limited war" --as that term was then used--but on the then-novel concept of "limited strategic war."

29. Halperin did not "confirm" to the Rand delegation that the missile gap was illusory. As he has just confirmed to me, he had had no access to the recent SNIE or any knowledge of the new estimate. On the contrary, it was he who was startled--along with most of the other participants--by Harry Rowen's pronouncement (as a Pentagon official) that there was no missile gap. This new fact had not--as I keep pointing out here--been "long established" at the time of the conference, but was quite recent. Rowen may well have communicated boredom with his former colleagues, Halperin comments, but it would have been based on

their inevitable lack of access to relevant current information, not, yet, because of a culpable inertia of thought. My own impatience with that inertia emerged in 1962 and later, as rethinking failed to occur.

HERKEN (pp. 143-145): "Ellsberg himself thought this kind of studied objectivity was what had recommended him for the study of nuclear warfare that Rand began in 1959. That same year he became a consultant to the Eisenhower administration on nuclear war planning.³¹

"...Upon first beholding the SIOP, Ellsberg said, he was 'appalled' by what he saw. no less remarkable than the indiscriminate nature of the destruction planned for was its seeming wantonness, he thought. Disbelieving the casualty estimates contained in the plan, Ellsberg had asked for a confirmation from the joint chiefs.³² Their reply confirmed not only the numbers but also what Ellsberg felt was the extraordinary callousness of the military to the prospect of a monumental loss of civilian life.³³ 'That was a shocker,' Ellsberg recalled. ... (Ellsberg was not alone in his outrage. Another young civilian who was briefed on the war plan at this time told colleagues that he thought its authors should be simply lined up on the White House lawn and shot)."³⁴

"...In June of 1961, therefore, the head of the Air Force's war planning division had declared that Soviet ICBMs numbered between 1120 and 160. That same month the officer responsible for SAC's estimate of Russian strength had speculated that the Soviets might have as many as a thousand intercontinental-range missiles. The following August...."³⁵

CORRECTIONS:

31. As a consultant from RAND, I was a member of a study group (organized by ONR) reporting to CINCPAC on problems of nuclear command and control in the Pacific (not on war plans). One of my chosen tasks within this group was to study the plans, to understand the command and control problems that would arise in implementing them. I later became a consultant to the DOD on command and control problems (first under SecDef Gates, in 1960); my first consulting on war plans was under Kennedy, in early 1961. 32. My knowledge of and concern about nuclear war plans related to the pre-SIOP plans; the first SIOP did not become operational until 1 July 1961. The SIOP, by the way, was not a "successor" to the JSCP, but was an annex to the JSCP, as was its predecessor plan for strategic nuclear war.

I had never seen an estimate of total casualties in the pre-SIOP planning or supporting documents; I suspected, and had been told, that none had been calculated. It was on that basis--not to confirm an estimate that I "disbelieved"--that I drafted a

question for the SecDef to address to the JCS, asking an estimate of total deaths in the Soviet Union and China if their plan were implemented. The question was put to the JCS by the White House, in the name of the President.

33. It turned out that the JCS had previously made this calculation, after all; they provided it promptly, in the form of a chart of casualties over six months, without any comment. The total figure was 325 million fatalities. It was this figure, and the fact that they knew it as the foreseeable result of carrying out plans they had constructed, that staggered and appalled me: nothing more than this in the way of tone or commentary, which was not available to me. (It might be noted that the JCS foresaw the most likely circumstances in which their plan might be implemented as a US nuclear first strike in response to non-nuclear hostilities in Europe, not a response to Soviet nuclear attack on the US or its forces; though I was appalled by the thought of deliberately, knowingly planning to inflict casualties on this scale even in retaliation to a nuclear attack.)

34. Actually: Carl Kaysen (not so young at the time), Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, on being told of my attitudes toward the JCS after reading their reply to the President on Soviet and Chinese casualties in the event of general war (quoted at the top of p. 144) informed me that it was the then-current fantasy/desire of President Kennedy to line up the JCS on the White House lawn and shoot them. But this thought, as Kaysen explained it, was not based on their nuclear war planning; he was referring to JFK's reaction to the JCS role in the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

35. Rather than reproduce all of page 145 and indicate individual corrections, let me just cite the pertinent facts. The June 1961 estimate is the range (as I recall) cited in the NIE, not the Air Force estimate. (Of course, it is Air Force Intelligence, not the Air Force war planning division, that makes estimates of Soviet missiles, as an input to the NIE.) SAC's estimate of 1000 missiles was stated to me in August (not June) at SAC Headquarters in Omaha, by the chief of SAC's war plans division, as being the personal estimate of the Command of SAC, General Thomas Power. It was this same officer, Colonel Dave Leibman, who told me in the same discussion at SAC: a) that only 200 of these missiles could be located precisely, in SAC's estimate; and b) that the JCS had recently told JFK that there would be no more than 10 million fatalities in the US if non-nuclear war in Europe forced the US to undertake a first strike.

I pointed out, first to Leibman and later, at his suggestion, to the SAC Chief of Intelligence, that there seemed to be a contradiction in these two estimates: i.e., that there would be at most 10 million fatalities although a US first strike would presumably leave at least 800 ICBMs (whose locations were unknown) untouched. (I have no idea how they arrived at the figure

of 10 million; when I mention that it is roughly the population of the metropolitan area, in telling this anecdote, it is to indicate the implausibility of such a low ceiling). When I suggested that an estimate of 800 missiles of unknown location could undermine Kennedy's resolve about standing firm over Berlin--which the JCS advocated--an assistant to the Chief of Intelligence expressed "horror" at what he purported to understand as a suggestion by me that SAC should "fudge" its estimate (i.e., lower the total ICBM estimate) for political purposes. (Although I denied this intent, the situation was risible because, as all of us in the room well understood, SAC had unconscionably inflated its estimate for a bureaucratic purpose, to expand its forces).

Although everyone knew that SAC estimates--whether of 1000 missiles or half that--were vastly exaggerated, it was not at all clear to me in August that the June NIE of 120 or so was greatly unrealistic: and that too, of course, was inconsistent with "only" 10 million US casualties. My inference from the 10 million estimate to a judgment that the JCS knew, even before September, 1961, that even the CIA estimates in the NIE, let alone those of the Air Force or SAC, were exaggerated, is a retrospective one. Indeed, it didn't occur to me till years later (by which time there was other evidence pointing in the same direction).

I'm sure I did not say that it was primarily bureaucratic considerations that finally brought the Air Force into line on the end of the missile gap. So far as I have ever been aware, the Discoverer evidence, when sufficiently complete, was regarded as conclusive, and brought about the collapse of the Air Force position. (SAC still fought it as long as it could, a few months more, then capitulated).

You will note the numerous discrepancies between the above comments and the account on pp. 144-45.

Many of them --as in the comments on the missile gap--are not unimportant to the substance of your analysis: matters of timing, hence context and motivation, and significantly affected. But I must also mention a personal aspect for me of this question of accuracy, which, I will acknowledge, makes me unhappy even with errors that are politically unimportant.

This book offers itself to be read especially by my former colleagues in the systems analysis, arms control, national security community, and by newer, younger members of that group. Many of the older ones will be personally familiar with the facts of the matters discussed here, in some cases from having heard my own accounts when I was their colleague. When I am made to appear the source (presumably on the basis of interviews) of very obviously inaccurate accounts and misleading observations, this will give them the impression that in the period since they knew me I have become a sloppy and thoroughly unreliable commentator.

For many of them, this will simply be ready confirmation of suspicions or prejudices they have already formed about me (in part, on the basis of earlier, inaccurate journalism!) Probably none of my former colleagues has ever attended a lecture of mine, and few will have read anything I have written lately: far fewer than will read this book. And it will help confirm their general (self-serving) belief that to be an "activist" is to be a demagogue careless with facts. Maybe I shouldn't care any more what they think, but in this respect I find that I do.

September 1986

Fragment of a History...

The war came because the world was primed.

For many years the humans of two great powers had been building destructive systems that were in some ways tough and durable, built to survive even nuclear attack. Yet in other respects the systems were delicate and, by design, volatile, prone to explode in certain circumstances that had occurred historically: great mousetraps, set to release their force at the pressure of a rat's whisker...or, possibly, a random footfall. And either one, triggered, would set off the other.

This instability was seen, at least as a hypothetical result, by analysts and leaders --and sensed more vividly by their publics--yet it emerged and grew as a result of conscious design and program choices on both sides. The objective of each state was to make certain disturbances of the existing order highly unlikely by making them highly dangerous. to...

Both parts of this objective were achieved. The events meant to be deterred did become less likely. In face of the dangers, decisionmakers on one side or the other backed away from incipient confrontations. Repeatedly they averted or aborted chains of circumstance that might have led to a full triggering disturbance, which was thus prevented for a generation and more. But what had been made dangerous, and thereby unlikely, had not been made impossible.

When the hitherto-deterred circumstances did occur--neither leadership backing down or acting to restrain the system embodying its threats before it lost control of events--the systems operated as they had been designed. For the most part, and in all crucial aspects, orders were issued and executed as prior plans dictated under the actual circumstances, and humans on both sides acted as they had frequently rehearsed envisioning just such circumstances and orders. had

The outcome--the physical destruction of civilization and poisoning of the biosphere--though desired by no one, could not be described as either accidental, unforeseen, or, save in a very qualified sense, unintended. No event in human history had been consciously prepared so elaborately or effectively as its ending.

/xouc2/fragment.his

An earlier entry:

I have lived for a number of years with a sense that my countrymen were constructing a catastrophe.

I taste ashes on the wind, drifting toward us from fires in our future.

What is most eerie is the deliberateness, the collaboration and efficiency with which the disaster is being prepared.

I feel, as I did during the Vietnam War, that this process needs not only to be resisted, it remains to be understood.

///

(First working day after getting in MacArthur Proposal, at 11:46 PM, September 30, Tuesday)

NOW WRITE:

1: What I Believe:

--Answers to the questions

--Full statements of my hypotheses

2. Why I believe it; how I came to guess it, or believe it; or, to arrive at hypotheses.

3. Who disbelieves it; and why I think they do, and why they're wrong.

(2) and (3) are lower priority; I got hung up on this during drafting. (3), partly for fear that these individuals (York?) or ones like them would be on my committee. (MBG warned me).

(Actually, she warned me not to criticize their views too overtly or polemically). (If McG B were on my committee, as he was on Jerry Sanders' SSRC committee, he might veto my proposal because of mention of Peddlers of Crisis. But then, he would oppose nearly everything I say! If one person represents all the views I oppose among "good guys," it's McGeorge: unless, Rathjens (who might well be on committee!)

4. What I Feared to Say:

--Certain hypotheses--esp. Construction of Instability--that seemed:

Too abstract

Too arms controlsy (both of these, for Ruth Adams)

Implausible; "conspiratorial"

Unfamiliar

Too all-of-above to be plausible in a brief account, without spelling out the argument or presenting evidence at length.

--Criticism of SAPS ("Stability is Absolute and Permanent" School: see (3).

--Accusations of our leadership, and my old colleagues. Pat: "I've always felt that you can't write because you can't bring yourself to say that these guys are murderers." (Or, culpably reckless fools: as Halberstam suggested).

They're my old bosses and friends; I chose them, was one of them, believed in them. (Do I secretly long for their continued respect? Even though association is denied me; and even though I now see what they--and we, I--did? For one thing, I don't blame them as much as I used to, or as some do; see today's file on Repression.

(Masson ignores this in his Assault on Freud). Also, I see their Good, or at least Other, distracting, intentions (not all bad, or at least malevolent). (Again, contrast Masson on Freud: his motives to protect his image of his father and his relation with him; and his friendship with Fliess; as opposed to his careerist incentives. And see Hersh's attack on Kissinger, which ignores various strategic motives, in addition to his toadying to Nixon.) (Masson is, oddly, "unpsychological." Hersh is, oddly, "unstrategic." In interpretations of their nemeses. Why are they so bitter: e.g., Hersh? See Powers' review of KAL-oo7.)

Of course (!) this is related to my reluctance to recognize, or accuse, Dad of being a murderer, or a reckless fool (or at least, the instrument of my wrecking, my disaster, my abandonment: as well as my "liberator"--in Monkey's Paw fashion--which was all I permitted myself to think. Hence, a kind of nameless, inchoate horror at their behavior (or a carping bitterness)), rather than a precise definition/recognition, which would suggest too strongly what I thought of Dad's action.

(When I asked Dad just once of his feelings after the Accident (sic), he said he was mainly worried that I would never forgive him. But actually, I never consciously considered that there was anything to forgive. (!)

--My Conspiracy Theory. What I think they're up to. Actually, this is an area not wholly resolved in my mind. Increasingly, I suspect that the role of conscious motives has varied from Administration to Administration; and even, the real (including unconscious) impact of a desire for First-use Threats (as distinct from other motives), esp. in the TW (Third World).

Thus, I think latter motive became especially strong, and a strong factor in the arms race, after Vietnam, the fall of the Shah, along with other independence movements--Angola, Nicaragua, etc.--the changed role of the US in the world economy--greater reliance on trade at the same time as greater competition--perhaps the new financial arrangements after 1971-73--the need for an RDF especially for the Middle East (ME) after failure of VN strategy and of proxy strategy (Iran)...

Much earlier (late 40s and 50s) FU/FS in NATO was a major

incentive, for diplomatic and financial reasons of relations with West Europe (including holding down CPs). Also, selling weapons, to keep the aerospace industry profitable (see USAF Postwar Planning). And, bolstering CW, for various reasons.

In 60s, there continued to be a planning incentive to "fight a war, if one comes, in the best way: to limit damage, end war, perhaps "prevail" or win: latter, with additional incentive of deterrence." (This was not, in late 50s-early 60s integrated with arms control policy, which was hardly considered. But even in late 60s and later, it doesn't seem to have been integrated--treated together--with arms control policy: either from compartmentation and inertia, or because this was really a cover for other aims, FU credibility/superiority, which couldn't be achieved by arms control).

But throughout the period, there was a need to support FU threats: e.g., Berlin 1948 (if not Iran 1946), and Korea 1950. And planning shows (Herken) that the Middle East oilfields were put on a coordinate basis, secretly, with NATO from the beginning: just like the Carter/Reagan Doctrine which made this overt.

This was even rationalized, as in case of Carter/Reagan doctrine (and crisis of August 1980) as being necessary to NATO: if SU controls ME oil, then NATO goes (or at least, US control of NATO goes! West Europe makes separate deals with SU!--as now, over gas! Finlandization! At that time, late '40's, the concern was for oil for the Navy: UK and US. See the British concern for their naval supplies--and their hard currency sales--in 1953, when Mossadegh nationalized Iranian oil.

At that time, Europe didn't depend on oil for energy; it used its own coal. But Marshall Plan changed that; it made Europe dependent on oil (shutting down coal mines!), sold to them by US firms, shipping ME oil. Since then, "the health of Western Europe"--i.e., Western capitalism--i.e., US domination of Western European economies--has depended on "access to" (via US firms) Middle East oil.

See Noam Chomsky's theory that the HAK/US nightmare all along has been that Europe and Japan would make independent deals--presumably with new regimes in the ME, not under our control--for energy, becoming independent of our firms and policy, our "oil weapon", just as might happen if Europe turned to Soviets for gas and oil.

Is this, now, all fantasy? Quite apart from SU's need for energy, would they turn down this lever of control, which has served US so well? If SU alert was just an exercise--as Komer says--why was it? Or do the Soviets assume, correctly, that any US Administration, even Jimmy Carter's, would go to nuclear war to protect Iran and Middle East oil, whatever the public expected or wanted? So that the Soviets don't really consider this at all; any more than they think about invading West Europe. (Which, however,

they do practice!)

Have they ever done the same for the Middle East, i.e., practice an invasion in maneuvers? Presumably their often-practiced invasion of West Germany is their (threatened, and planned) answer to invasion of East Europe/Germany by Germany; whereas they don't expect any invasion from the Middle East. But why isn't the latter part of their rehearsed response to intrusion by NATO forces? Or is it?

This would be the real "horizontal escalation." Judging from the studies reported by Armed Forces Journal, this would be a jugular genuinely unguarded--except by nuclear weapons--just like Berlin, but far more important. Is that what SAC, the NATO buildup, and the first-use apparatus and policy have always been mainly for: to deter or respond to an attempt by the Soviets to takeover the Middle East oilfields, or to intervene against a US intervention against "radical" revolutionary movements in the Middle East?

See two previously-secret nuclear crises both revealed by Nixon in July, 1985: both designed, in 1956 and in 1973, to prevent the Soviets from intervening unilaterally in Egypt--as they explicitly threatened to do if we refused to join them in their proposed joint peacekeeping force--to "separate the warring forces," i.e., to halt an offensive by our allied "enforcers" in the Middle East, earlier the British, French and Israelis, in 1973 the Israelis alone, both against the Egyptians.

What were we afraid of? (Note all the similarities, which I will not analyze here. Look this up in: Miles Copeland; Rope of Sand; Chomsky; Hoopes on Dulles (see my crisis study of Suez, which I participated in); etc.) Presumably, a direct, "legitimate" role for Soviet Union in Egypt and Middle East; "with us," "equal to us". Why so bad? Wouldn't it limit our ability to intervene unilaterally in future events in the Middle East: to prevent the coming to power of independent regimes which might not be under the influence of the Soviets (or might) but which might deal independently with Western Europe and Japan?

And see the financial implications of the control of ME oil. (Peter Dale Scott) PDS says: It is our protector relation to the current (unpopular, corrupt, autocratic: not fundamentalist) regimes that led to their deciding to demand payment for oil in dollars, a crucial policy that Wachtel doesn't explain at all, though he describes it as the fundamental basis of the new world monetary arrangement, which saved our ass, not only in the oil crisis but--for years--from pressure of world trade competition.

How does Israel fit into this? Probably in a complicated way: as the ultimate protector of US interests, a base and active intervenor, guarding against the emergence of "radical regimes." In this latter case, it functions in the interests of the current Arab regimes as well, which can meanwhile pose as

nationalist (despite their relation to the US!) by their anti-Israeli stance (like Mexico, in its pro-Cuba/anti-US foreign policy stance; or various countries in their anti-Communism, which would be endangered by genuine peace with Israel! (Presumably Israel, which likewise requires an "Arab threat," but would clearly prefer the current regimes to radical successors, banks on this, lives with it, encourages it).

Note PDS' inhibitions about writing directly about his overall "conspiracy" hypotheses. My inhibitions show up in not writing at all, or not on this aspect. His show up in style: pointillist accretion of "linkages," footnotes, evidence, without a clearly stated thesis. Both of us are wary both of radical image and of criticism from scholars. He has to worry about academic standing; I don't have any, but act as if I did, and had to protect it.

--Criticism of my Left friends, on nuclear issue. (Chomsky, Klare, EPT. Essentially, emphasizing so much the issue of intervention and foreign policy and interests as to downplay the coordinate, associated problems of the arms race, first-use threats and the real danger of nuclear war (Chomsky does, now, emphasize latter: but not the way in which the new arms race, with its destabilizing weapons, strengthens the coupling of FU threats and FU in the TW to the possibility of escalation).

EPT follows Zuckerman--and York--in a kind of technological determinism (like Marx! Whom EPT paraphrases directly, come to think of it: "If the handmill produces...and the steam engine produces...what do these weapons produce? Exterminism!" But this is wrong, now; and was probable wrong for Marx's syllogism! But they do condition social and leadership choices.) Also, they overemphasize the domestic political power of the weapons labs (as does de Witt? Understandably. Still, on Star Wars, the role of Teller and Wood seems quite specific...).

Of course, Leftists other than EPT seem to have neglected the nuclear issue in the past entirely--see SR (and my leaving them) and NLR (and EPT's leaving them)--on grounds that it was mere neutral technology, depending on who used it (see CP's position in Japan: only "imperialist" Bombs were bad). All this seems changed now (Japan?).

--The role of MNCs in US foreign and military policy; the requirements of Empire, postwar style--now, 1980s style. (Is shift to open US intervention, RDF backed up by FU threats and FS buildup, with Rambo unilateralist, vigilante ideology (anti-World Court, ignoring allies, flaunting even domestic legislation against involvement or against use of US to plan or carry out hostile acts) comparable in motivation to the "imperialist scramble" of the late 19th century, when emphasis on "free trade" (the "empire of free trade"--multilateralism) gave way to naked colonial adventures and direct rule? Then the pressure was from rising competition from Germany and France. Now, similarly: plus rising rebellion in the former colonies themselves. (Plus--or

not?--an increasingly active role by the SU?

Am I the counterpart to a Little Englander? (check that out)

Certainly, I am an anti-imperialist. See the Anti-Imperialist League in Mass. with respect to the Phillippines (!): e.g., F...)

--Note the role, in the lead-in to WWI of imperial rivalries and imperial pressure on TW countries, "crises"--along with the role of technology, and the pressures of independence movements. I might have mentioned this in my analogy with WWI!

--In lectures, I always shy away from telling, in the lecture, "This is what I think it's all about" (see above, conspiracy). Too speculative; too unfamiliar; too radical. I say it only if asked in question period: even when I have vowed to myself to go into it beforehand, in the lecture.

4. What I Thought of Saying, but discarded, for space:

Colorful personal history angles, as lead-in:

600 million dead, in SIOP

Quemoy, Berlin, Cuba II as background on FU threats

How I learned about Nixon's FU threats (Haldemand, Ahmad, Morris; Hersh.

Nixon's actions towards me, because of his fear that I knew of his FU threats (Hersh). Compare Nixon's "That Ellsberg thing was stupid...I don't know why I did it" (Newsweek, 1985. He's probably forgotten! Or else he's still protecting his nuclear threats: yet, that same month, he was revealing the latter in Time, for the first time! Perhaps he was concealing--even from himself?--the lengths he had gone to to keep these secret at the time.

(How much does Jimmy Carter admit to himself that he engaged in consideration of FU in the ME, in August of 1980? See Brown's denials; and Carter's silence in his memoirs. This was just shortly before his final speech on the nuclear menace. It was soon before his debate in which he quoted Amy against the risk of nuclear war (see memoirs). Soon after failed hostage raid. Just around time of convention, in which, like LBJ in 1964, he faced an opponent believed to be prone to military action, shooting from the hip, toughness, and friendship to nuclear weapons. Would he have wanted it known that he--like LBJ himself in 1964! (Seabrook: see Henry Cabot Lodge and Canadian to LBJ, August 1964)--had been involved in discussions of using nuclear weapons?!

My past "crimes" (see file on repression: as examples of my forgetting).

Quotes from RFK, end of memoir, on Bethmann on WWI; and Sorensen on whether anyone has a right to risk future generations (RFK's raising this--posthumously--is like "retirement syndrome" affecting Rickover, McNamara, etc.

--Cuba II. See my WGBH transcript.

MacArthur.25

October 3, 1986

Significance:

--Change public awareness of:

- 1) actual policy
- 2) actual past practice, hidden history, near misses: and for what?
- 3) current preparations: RDF
- 4) Bearing of actual policy and practice on "secular" FU/NFU controversy (Gang of 4, Atlantic)
- 5) Bearing on moral FU/NFU controversy: Bishops
- 6) Bearing on "deterrence" controversy: Methodists, Bishops, Ethicists: in light of real varieties of deterrence, main aspects of deterrence (Type II), real risks it has exposed us to, real attitudes of leaders it is based on, ; the temptations that even preparation for Type I gives rise to; the
- 7) the urgency of stopping the advent of destabilizing weapons; hence the relative advantages of arms control proposals that do this--Freeze, CTB, anti-MIRV, etc.--vs ones that don't: Build-down, "reductions," START, SALT, TTB...
- 8) discover true nature of US relationships with the poor countries of the world; reasons for intervention; contribution to revolutionary aspirations and struggle; nature of regimes we ally ourselves with; reasons we "need" an RDF, including reasons for the lack of "allies" in various regions, and reasons we have trouble getting bases for the RDF; real need to discover alternative foreign policies...
- 9) See arms race as a "cost" of our FU policy, our current intervention policy, our current and past foreign policy toward the TW.; likewise, see the risk of nuclear war as increasing for this reason, and being as high as it is--including the prospects for proliferation (which is, in the light of this history, even riskier than it may have appeared: leaders do not have to more mad than past US presidents to be dangerous to international security--because of these policies. Hence...

--Reorient "elite" discussions: of FU/NFU;
of moral aspects of FU and of Type I Deterrence;
; of all above.

--Need to understand the moral universe of decision-makers; where it differs from that of the public, confront that fact, change decision-makers, or their values, or modify one's own....But with respect to last possibility: note that the decisionmakers' current framework--which preceded nuclear weapons--led causally to the current arms race and current policies and the current risk of war: reasons to question it, despite its elite adherents, their reasons for affirming it, its "modernized" aspects as an ethical approach.

--Both public and elites need to reexamine:

--their attitudes toward the threat of nuclear weapons, or of intervention, as distinct from actual execution; if it is more positive than toward execution, they should reconsider the degree to which threats lead to preparations for execution and to the rejection of alternatives, in the interests of credibility; and how this actually does increase the risks of war: in some circumstances, and perhaps overall.

(Thus, given threats, and commitment

Basic conception: That US nuclear weapons are not exclusively, to even primarily, to deter Soviet first-use as to deter Soviet second-use, i.e., to deter Soviet retaliation to US first use. Obviously, that would hardly be possible if US first-use were directed against Soviet forces or cities in the Soviet Union, East Europe or probably, in West Europe.

And against an opponent that had no relation at all to the Soviet Union, Soviet retaliation to US first use would almost surely not arise as an issue, a possibility, a threat. (China would pose special considerations: an adversary of the Soviet Union, yet a Communist nation and a neighbor, a rival for leadership of the "socialist" bloc...)

The real concern is to keep the Soviet Union from extending, in threats and promises, a "nuclear umbrella" against US intervention or US first-use, over allies or client states of the Soviet Union. This is achievable, by threat of US escalation or preemption. Thus, the US may deter Soviet second-use in the Third World by threatening either to expand the nuclear conflict or to prevent a Soviet first-strike and prevent or limit a Soviet second-strike, by US preemption.

The aim of US first-strike strategic forces is to "free" US first-use by deterring Soviet second-use in the Third World. (!)

SAC is meant to make the Third World safe for US first-use, by deterring Soviet second-use.

To reduce the risk of nuclear war, both limited and all-out, it is more important than has been generally realized to change US foreign and military policy toward the Third World. This means redefining US "vital interests" in the Third World, and also plans and strategies for safeguarding those interests that are still regarded, after reexamination, as important. Either eliminating or minimizing the risk of nuclear war arising from a Third World conflict would almost surely require abandoning a policy that made use of threats of US first use in the Third World (or elsewhere! Since threats elsewhere, and preparations to implement those threats--e.g. in NATO--would almost surely be extended to cover "real" critical challenges in the Third World, especially in the pressure of a crisis). It would also be necessary to cut the link between Soviet retaliation to US first-use and threats and preparations for US escalation or preemption.

(from earlier draft, McArthur.17):

To reduce the risk of nuclear war, either limited or all-out, it is more important than most have realized to reexamine, reevaluate, and modify--perhaps first bringing under more democratic control--US interrelationships and mutual dependence with Third World regimes, resources and people, US foreign and interventionary policies, US first-use policy in the Third World as well as Europe, and the linkages between all of these and US strategic nuclear forces and weapons programs.

Underlying this is the conclusion that risks of all-out thermonuclear war are implicit--via US first-use policy--in every major US intervention, and thus--via US intervention policy (largely secret from the public, both in its covert aspects and in its planned readiness for overt engagement) are implicit in overall US foreign policy towards the Third World.

This is a new, late-Twentieth Century reason for questioning and modifying age-old imperial relationships between "core" nations of advanced technology and industry and "peripheral" nations of less advanced military capability. Efforts to expand or maintain imperial controls over weaker nations, in rivalry with other nations highly developed in destructive power, now have the potential of ending most "advanced" life in the Northern Hemisphere or even (given the dependence of the poorer Southern Hemisphere on the North for food, fertilizer, energy and technology) on the globe.

It is not only US relations with the Third World that need changing--to reduce the perceived "need" for US interventions and FU threats--but US relations with the Soviet Union, which have the potential both for stimulating armed Third World conflicts and US/Third World conflicts and for turning them into nuclear crises and wars. Thus, detente appears more important--so far as it

reduces the likelihood of a Third World conflict being perceived as threatening US vital interests and calling for a US commitment or intervention or FU threat.

Likewise, the arms race itself appears more threatening in this light, in interfering with detente and general peacemaking and coordination with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the arms race, in its budgetary pressure, encourages a US Administration demonize the Soviet Union and to interpret Soviet moves in the most threatening light (KAL-007, Soviet weapons programs, Afghanistan, Soviet involvement in Central America, support of terrorism) so as to mobilize support for the expenditures of the arms race. This in turn causes new incidents to be seen as "crises," calling for a US military response, and prevents negotiations, agreements or collaborative action to solve existing disagreements or avert sources of conflict.

Relieved of the requirement to bolster credibility of US first-use threats, US planners (led by the public!) could reexamine "on their own merits" preparations for "(second-strike) insurance," damage-limiting systems and tactics designed to reduce damage "if a war occurs." This possible contribution would probably, in almost every case, appear outweighed by the effect of such a capability in raising Soviet fears of US preemption in a crisis, thus stimulating Soviet countermeasures and possible LOW or preemption in a crisis.

If the latter effects were seen as wholly negative--in the absence of reliance on the threat of US preemption, as a deterrent to SU second-use or escalation--they would indicate the desirability of abandoning such "insurance," as increasing risks greater than those they protected against. That is, it would be desirable to abandon preparations for: preemption, decapitation, launch-on-warning (whose speed of response is necessary only to achieve damage-limiting aims: which depend on having capabilities for prompt counterforce which pose a threat of preemption, and for that reason are to be abandoned) (An automated "launch-after-attack" system would not pose this danger).

This rejection of damage-limiting would simply apply to offensive systems the rejection of ABM systems accepted in the ABM Treaty. Perhaps the major motivation for the ABM Treaty was not so much crisis stability as "arms race stability"; averting a major build-up both of defensive arms (which, at that stage, wouldn't work at all, anyway) and offensive arms (even greater than that which did ensue). That may also be true for the opposition to Star Wars. But I am arguing that there is a real problem of crisis stability: especially in the light of the possibility of limited nuclear wars arising out of US interventions (conceivably occasioned, by the way, by SU interventions: not as often or as critically as Reagan infers and claims, but to some significant extent).

The effect of abandoning damage-limiting, preemptive

capabilities--both in existing systems and in programmed systems--would be to reduce or eliminate the coupling between a tactical nuclear exchange in the Third World, a limited nuclear war, and US or Soviet escalation. This would have the effect of making Soviet second-use retaliation to US first use more likely, thus making making US first use threats less credible and execution of such threats more risky. But such execution is risky enough already to be rejected (and on moral grounds as well).

Again, without other changes in capabilities, some US interventions would thereby appear more risky, less desirable. But the premise of this policy shift would be a rejection of US FU threats anyway, and a reduction of US interventions. And one reason for this rejection would be the arms race effects it would permit, i.e., the abandonment of investment in damage-limiting, first-strike capability.

[Compaq]

c:\auto\preface

Notes

Friday, 28 June 1988

The World of Sex/ The world of violence

Male, organized, violence: massacre, mass murder

Henry Miller: to write what is not written down in books

Not love, sex; fucking, not love-making; horniness, not desire

Not specified by Miller, now seen to be implicit: male sex

(Not all men, all the time, versus women never; most men some of the time; a small (?) minority of women, like a much larger fraction of men, much of the time). Attitudes: unattachment, "other as object," self-gratification, momentary pleasure; and almost constant readiness for this.

Similar gender differences, insufficiently explored: sex; violence; technology; secrecy; risk-taking (of doing or suffering violence). Me, earlier: to reveal, publish, what is written in secret books, not intended for the public.

Like pornography, forbidden (to write or read, to think, to desire, to feel, to do); not to be acknowledged publicly; to be read secretly, in private.

Unlike pornography...

Bound to be similarities (in what is forbidden, taboo).

But: secrets I revealed: Not sexually arousing, attractive (except to someone really sick!) Forbidden, secret, because they involve breaking moral codes and laws; publication would have political consequences, lead to condemnation, loss of status, condemnation or punishment.

Implications for physical destruction of societies--our own and others--are entirely different. For physical, societal, catastrophe.

What I revealed was significant largely for what--comprehensive as it was--it did not show: good reasons for what we were doing; evidence supporting official assertions to the public, as to what was real, what was believed, what was aimed for, what was planned, what was expected. Though the Pentagon Papers revealed quite different propositions on all these latter matters, it did not convincingly provide reasons for the actions, plans, intentions. They raised anew the question, rather than answering it: Why were we in Vietnam? Why were we continuing to destroy it?

Still, an attraction for me (and not only me, among men) for imagery of violence: in particular, the duel, battle among men, armed or trained or ready for violence, a violent elite, volunteers (not, violence against the unwilling, the "weak," the unarmed, unthreatening, the "innocent": women, children, old, sick, "civilians" (in war)).

Furthermore, for me, a preoccupation with catastrophe: physical, and social. An ambivalence toward catastrophe, like ambivalence

toward violence? (Or, for many women, ambivalence--rather than pure revulsion--toward "sex", even fantasies of rape?)

General hypothesis: what is "unduly" risked, is less strongly or unequivocally feared or disliked than "normally"; the attitude of the risk-taker may be more than normally ambivalent, seeing some advantage or attraction to the "loss."

What is feared by most secret-keepers--with good reason--is social isolation, ostracism, exile, if they reveal the secrets: the loss of friends and relationships (as well as career): as if they were exiled, or emigrated; as if they had stepped out of a space capsule without an umbilical cord.

I experienced this: like other members of ARDIS (or Ingvar Bratt). And I chose it. Without, to be sure, fully realizing that it would be permanent. In this, too, I was like the other whistle-blowers. But if we were "naive" about our former colleagues (Bratt, for example, expected approval from most of them; as well as renewed friendship "when the dust settled"), why was this? Why were we (if we were) less realistic about the consequences of our revelations--as well as more willing to accept some risk (which we may have underestimated)?

For my part: I had found myself in outer space, in exile, once before, my most important relationships severed forever. That time I did not choose it, I was pushed out of the capsule; that is an experience I have sought to avoid. Yet, I survived it. And it even had a liberating meaning for me (along with a sense of horror, loss and guilt too great to face or feel consciously, that I can only infer). Thus, my willingness, perhaps even compulsion (Freud's repetition syndrome) to repeat this trauma--this time with mastery, control--as, in Vietnam, I chose to risk death.

And that earlier experience was one of violent catastrophe: in a technology steered by a man, my father, who (obedient to the commands of a woman, my mother) risked falling asleep at the wheel, and lost the gamble: killing his "superior," his wife, and an "innocent," his daughter, my sister (and breaking my knee). That gives me a special perspective on, and sensitivity to, the possibility of catastrophe. And has a lot to do, no doubt, with my obsession with warning others about it (a typical survivor pattern), and acting otherwise to reduce its probability. And striving to understand it...how was it/is it possible? How could "they" work to prepare it, to make it more likely? How did I?

Now I embark on the work I have been preparing to do for thirty years, the greater part of my life. To write down what I have learned of the answers to these questions; and before that, to write of the experiences and perceptions that led me, as an adult, to these questions. Experiences that led me to a preoccupation with understanding the probability--and acting to reduce it--of certain social catastrophes: direct or indirect involvement in civil wars or aggression; possible first-use of nuclear weapons;

the possibility of general nuclear war.

In particular, what I mean to write, now, is "what has not been written down in books," by me or by others, neither for the public nor in secret. Secrets, this time of attitudes, values, expectations, of readiness, that are recorded, if at all, only in most-secret, most carefully guarded notes ("higher" than Top Secret--the classification of the Pentagon Papers) and are more generally not written down at all: revealed in writing only between the lines, in omissions, or alluded to by codewords and euphemisms; with the same true even of highly private conversation, which is, however, occasionally explicit.

Miller: the poet of horniness, secret male readiness for "unsentimental," unattached sex.

My theme: secret male institutional readiness for massacre. And its potential--in a world of competing male-dominated institutions (do certain hierarchical institutions take on a "male character" in orientation toward conflict and violence, somewhat regardless of the gender of their leadership and members?), nation-states and movements aspiring to become or lead nation-states--for overwhelming catastrophe.

These were the experiences and perceptions that led me, this time by choice, to step out of the space capsule in 1969 (again to survive, though without any of my former attachments). They shaped the concerns that have continued to preoccupy me since the war ended in 1975: my efforts to understand, as well as to change, certain realities, of attitudes as well as actions.

In order:

--C3 work.

--JCS answer to question on deaths;

--in particular, their awareness, their readiness to tell, in writing (graph: a straight line, approximate, but...like the bound-in-leather official history of the extermination of the Warsaw Ghetto). Then: the planning, before and after, in the light of this awareness.

--(Like my feeling about HST's announcement of Hiroshima.)

(At least the JCS had the "decency"--Himmler's word--to keep this calculation so secret I had come to believe it did not exist). (No such corresponding calculated prediction exists on paper--does it?--for the outcome of the Final Solution. Nor any order for the plan or program signed by Hitler. Note JFK's reluctance to sign a BNSP; so far as I know, he successfully avoided ever authorising the war plans in writing).

--I wrote war plans...

--End of missile gap. (As in Vietnam, my feeling of "How could they?" should be posed, as Gelb pointed out, "How could I, how could we?" Yet my feelings were typically aroused by discovery

that others, above me, had known things I didn't know, or knew that things I believed weren't true, in ways that made their behavior newly problematic for me. "How could they, knowing what they knew, believing what they believed?" Yet as Gelb suggests, it is useful at least heuristically to make guesses based on empathy, exploring our similarity and my knowledge of my own motivations. If I was misled about certain things (which perhaps they weren't) might they not have been misled, or "self-deceived" about others, in ways that shaped their behavior? May not the ways I was recruited or manipulated into wrongful participation provide insights into the ways they came to be abusive authorities, perhaps without being any more "malevolent," on balance, than I was?

--Cuba II: Nitze's expectation of general war (10%: or as he paraphrases this now: "no chance." JFK: 1-3--1/2. My reaction then to what they had done, in this light. (My knowledge in 1964 of the chances they had really run). In 1987: new knowledge of JFK's willingness to run, on Saturday, risks he believed to be unnecessary and unwarranted (and which were greater than he knew).

--(Study of nuclear crises: Suez, etc.)

--Vietnam 1964 (incidentally: "readiness" for Tonkin Gulf crisis and "response": the 94 (?) target list, the draft resolution). (General issue from crisis study: "cocking" for crisis, as a result for previous crisis (readiness; need to show toughness, win a victory) (See Lebanon-Grenada, Vietnam-Nicaragua...drawing lines...Cuba II--Brezhnev buildup...See Ford on "cocking" and stability; see preemption, readiness, as factors in "strategic instability.")

--Vietnam, 1965 (again, readiness for Rolling Thunder, and my participation; secrecy of ground combat escalation in April.): above all, choice of unlimited escalation (yet surprisingly deceptive; and, as in 1961, Presidentially-limited, in terms this time of bombing) in the face of JCS "realistic" estimates (vs. Quagmire Myth). Especially in the light of 1985- revelations of authoritative civilian warnings of "catastrophe." How could McNamara and LBJ...?

--Vietnam, 1968 on: the continuation of the war seven years after Tet, by a thoroughly disillusioned bureaucracy.

--The reaction at RAND to our letter; and of all my former colleagues to my revelation of the Pentagon Papers. (How could they not...?)

--US secret acceptance and encouragement of--and even involvement in--massacre in Indonesia in 1965 (and later in Central and South America): learned, to my shock, in 1977.

All these involve my awareness of secret attitudes and readiness, mostly not written down anywhere, which meant that common understandings of the behavior were wrong, and which raised questions about the real motivations and meanings of the behavior which have taken me many years to begin to answer.

I have also learned some things it is time to write down about human readiness to confront, resist and change destructive and catastrophically dangerous institutionalized behavior. (Behavior for which people would be put in institutions if they did it on their own; but which they do en masse, with social approval, because they are in institutions). Things that may yet save us.

[Compaq]

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c:\auto\lessons.vn
2 August 1988

(after hearing from Brian Willson that Wright and Byrd are preparing an agreed package that will free 18 million of blocked military aid for the contras--"in light of Ortega's recent repressions, suspending La Prensa for two weeks and jailing 5 politicians and expelling the US Ambassador for supporting a rally of dissidents).

Most lessons of Vietnam (see W. Pfaff on Vann articles: "Common lessons: either that we should have tried harder and longer; or that our allies weren't worthy of our support"--as in aid to contras) presume the legitimacy of our effort and the worthiness/altruism of our motives.

They are like Rules for Rapists; a Mugger's Handbook.

How to choose victims; how to tell when to avoid attack, when to desist facing opposition; what territory to stalk in; how to avoid getting caught, or convicted.

Or, rules for Bank Robbery, which would include: how to pick members of the gang; how to assign roles; training; how to acquire inside assistance, how to control, how to divide the loot, how to motivate.

Or, dope ring; how to corrupt the police; how to get "support of the public" (silence to police; children to do warning and alerting; delivery to customers...

Kennedy School is training for prospective consiglieri to the Mafia, like Kissinger (or Neustadt).

Advice--reflecting experience and "lessons learned"--is both prudential/instrumental (see Newman on Kahn: a handbook for mass murder: how to do it, how to get away with it) and also ethical: the procedural and other rights of members of the team/mob, certain things "that would be wrong" (perhaps, for some squeamish mobsters, dealing in heroin: earlier (or perhaps not? Was that just a legend? See The Godfather).

What is not part of counsellor's warnings: a) That would be illegal. b) That would violate the fundamental human rights of people outside the organization. (The latter are not seen as having fundamental rights the mob or its leaders are bound to respect).

What is involved (though this is never explicit: it is "inchoate") are rules for Just Empire. (See Machiavelli?)

(Compare: Just Slavery; Just Torture; Just Terrorism)

What is ignored are the criteria of the Declaration of Independence: rules for Just Revolution. The Declaration does not assume that every revolution, or war of independence, is legitimate, or prudent: but that a revolution or war of independence may be legitimate: the Declaration suggests some sufficient criteria.

The Cold War rules assume, on the contrary, that no breakaway from the Free Market can be legitimate; especially if it involves violent resistance; and that any degree of violence is justified in suppressing it.

A historical precedent for this attitude is the Northern attitude toward the Civil War: Lincoln's suppression of the attempt at secession is unquestionably legitimate, even obligatory; the attempt was obviously illegitimate. (Question: how did Lincoln get the Southerners to fire the first shot, at Sumter? What if they hadn't, then? (Like, what if Hitler hadn't declared war on the U.S.?)

On Just Empire:

--If rebels have a different language, religion, culture; and live in a compact territory; separated by water or land from the rest of the empire/nation;

--if they have not previously been governed by one's own nation for some period; perhaps with some degree of consent, and with benefits; i.e., if the issue is whether one has the right or should try to acquire power of government from a previous "owner"/ruler, as in Vietnam.

(Lesson: Don't try to conquer a former French colony in Asia, that has won a war against the French, despite US aid to the French...

More generally: Be skeptical and cautious against tryin to subdue/"pacify" a people who have previously fought and won a war of independence against an industrial power, especially one that had been aided financially and technically by the strongest empire in the world...

--Be skeptical and cautious about joining the losing side of a civil war (a side that is not winning and could not win without foreign aid...) (e.g., British aid to Confederacy)

(That would have been a caution to the Soviets in Afghanistan, though it doesn't fit exactly).

"But the South wanted to secede so it could maintain slavery."

Yeah, and the Afghanistanis resisted revolutionary government--and then the Soviets--so they can maintain female slavery, and deal dope.

And the American colonists wanted to expand into Indian territory across the Appalachians, and exterminate Indians.

Very commonly, the local people, whether colonists or indigenous, want among other things to maintain a system of exploitation and oppression which the empire for one reason or another (e.g., divide and conquer: or avoidance of conflict) proposes to "liberalize."

How to decide whether to resist movements to secede? Or to aid them? Biafra; Palestinians; Northern Ireland; Miskitos...

Issue: (between, say, 19th century British "imperialists" and Little Englanders: Is Force and Occupation a first resort, or a last? Are other methods of domination favored, or not?

More radically: Is force, including hiring and arming local soldiers, excluded? Are other methods of conflict resolution, like courts or arbitration, accepted as possible, or excluded?

A different sort of Lesson: Take seriously issues of legitimacy: of effort, of means, of allies.... Not only "as you see it," but attitudes held by: your own public; your allies; your collaborators in the country in question; your enemies. The latter are important facts, whether you agree with the attitudes or not. And the former affects your own troops, officials...

Marxist analyses, or definitions, of "imperialism" are misleading and inadequate: too narrow use of term: like defining "murder" as "white on white male violence in connection with crack dealing." Too narrow as to perpetrators and victims, too narrow historical period, too narrow on motives...

--suggests, for ideological reasons, too narrow analogies, class membership, both contemporarily and historically. Better: Capitalism is one late form of Imperialism. (Markets, not wage labor, as defining characteristic of capitalism; which has imperialistic phenomena at earliest stages. Socialism is another form...)

Recall Chicago Tribune (and recall study comparing Tribune and Times editorials on Indochina) in late Forties, comparing US criticism of French effort in Indochina as akin to "a dispute among pickpockets on which gets to work the more lucrative side of the street."

[Compag]

C-102/proposal.52a

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25 June 1989
CII proposal

The existential challenge of our time is that although large-scale thermonuclear war is acknowledged by all to be the ultimate catastrophe and to be unthinkable, it has not been made impossible.

Quite the contrary: enormously expensive and highly organized preparations are made each year and programmed for years in the future to alert the two superpowers to evidence of events that would supposedly warrant deliberately initiating it, and in those circumstances to executing warplans, elaborated years in advance, for waging thermonuclear war and attempting, despite all disclaimers, to "win" it.

Other catastrophes loom, lesser only by comparison with this one: global warming, ozone depletion. (They threaten enormous disruption and loss of life: but not the end of organized life in the Northern Hemisphere or the possible extinction of life on earth). They differ in resulting from the unorganized activity of millions of institutions and individuals in their daily affairs. The preparations for thermonuclear war are highly planned and hierarchically organized.

And the war itself can be set in motion by a single individual: the political leader of the US or the Soviet Union. Or if we take into account the possibility of catalytic action, initiatives, authorized or not, by subordinates in the chain of nuclear command or by leaders or subordinates in lesser nuclear states that could set off the nuclear machinery of the two superpowers, the number of individuals who might trigger a large-scale exchange is in the hundreds or thousands.

For a number of years I have been haunted by the thought: I live in a society that is preparing a catastrophe.

What do we mean by "possible"? Many who acknowledge that the probability that this system, potentially explosive by design, will actually explode is greater than zero, still think of this probability as extremely low, on the order of estimates that reigned for many years for the probability of a core meltdown in a nuclear reactor: say, 1/1000,000,000,000.... Acceptably low. Those, of course, are the estimates that used to be made, before Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.

Those estimates were of the same order as estimates of the chance of a failure of an aerospace shuttle flight, before the Challenger explosion. Or estimates by the oil industry of a

catastrophic oil spill in the Alaskan Sound, before the Exxon Valdez.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the practical equivalent to Three Mile Island: not the feared, ultimate catastrophe--indeed, only one person died--but a dress rehearsal for it, a near-miss. Yet this event did not lead to an urgent reconsideration or reevaluation upward of the real risks of nuclear war (despite extreme, probably exaggerated anxiety among the public in the US and much of the rest of the world during the crisis itself).

[Why not? --Like Hiroshima, the crisis was associated with a great American victory that immediately followed it: the success overshadowed and seemed to justify the preceding decisions.

--Information on the decision-making preceding and during the crisis--again, like Hiroshima but unlike TMI and the other disasters--was classified and remained highly secret for a generation.

--Thus, for both the above reasons, there was no public investigation (unlike, say, Pearl Harbor or the MacArthur hearings).

--There was almost no study of the incident and its risks even within the government: except for mine, there was only the WSEG study (extremely closely held within the JCS, even from the SecDef); and the three studies in CIA focussing on the intelligence failure).

--High-level accounts did emerge in the '60's which appeared both comprehensive and reassuring: highly laudatory, in particular, of the President's decision-making (by his official historian, his speech-writer, and his brother). In retrospect these accounts have proven extremely inadequate and misleading, in some respects deliberately so. But even some of the most recent accounts--still, by the President's Assistant for National Security, and by scholars at the Kennedy School, who have accepted too credulously assertions by Kennedy's officials--retain this tone of reassurance, and in particular, high appreciation of the President's role and command of events.

According to these interpretations, the public's fears at the time--and in the more recent accounts, even the President's reported concerns--were greatly overwrought.

--Much emphasis has been put on the way the international system has changed since then--in part, as the result of the crisis--in ways that make a replay unlikely and, if it occurred, less dangerous.

I was myself a second-level participant in the latter stage of the crisis--serving on working-groups staffing the ExComm in the last six of the "thirteen days." My own estimate at the time of the risk that the crisis would explode in large-scale nuclear war was, unlike the public's (and, I later learned, my bosses') estimate, extremely low: as I now see it, very much too low. But I did think then that I had experienced the way in which thermonuclear war would come about, if it ever did. This was in great contrast to the model of war initiation that had preoccupied me for several previous years as a RAND employee and consultant to the Secretary of Defense and White House, during which I had drafted the official Kennedy guidance for the war plans for general nuclear war.

That had focussed primarily on the possibility of a Soviet surprise nuclear attack on the US: secondarily, on war arising from a deliberate Soviet decision to blockade Berlin or to invade Western Europe. In the fall of 1961 I had learned that the Soviets had not made the effort we had supposed to acquire an ICBM force remotely capable of surprise attack; and when the US revealed to the Soviets our new awareness of this reality--in a speech I myself proposed and drafted--the Berlin crisis of that year appeared to subside.

Yet one year later the Cuban Missile Crisis recalled me to an awareness that nuclear war was, nevertheless, still possible, by a route different from what I and my colleagues had earlier supposed: a path of miscalculations on both sides, actions unforeseen much earlier by either, ill-understood in their effects by the actor, in their intent by its opponent and in their interaction by both, choices by each that an informed observer could properly judge reckless and misguided, defining together a course toward war like that which determined the outbreak of World War I.

I determined to study this episode with the best access to information that could be achieved, to discover the faults in a system that had permitted us to come this close to a war that, surely, neither side had earlier intended or desired.

For over six months in 1964 I did arrange to study this and related crises, with high-level access that had little precedent. [Before I could write out a report of my findings, I was invited to join the government in a role that, I anticipated correctly, would let me observe from the inside a comparable process: the escalation of our intervention in Vietnam. My initial desire simply to add to my understanding drew me into a ten-year involvement, first as an accomplice then as a resister, in a tragic and criminal war.] Much of the most relevant information I gained has not yet ever been released elsewhere, over a quarter-century later. In a number of respects it drastically affects "lessons" that have been drawn as recently as this year: it is clearly time that this information become more generally available.

Yet it is also clear that this information, and my own interpretations, are not the last word. Other information that has lately begun to surface, wholly unknown to me--and most other participants and analysts--at the time has a bearing that strongly modifies my own prior understanding of events. It points toward the existence of other data that are still undisclosed and about which major participants are still lying, presumably to conceal...something. We are now, I would guess, in the middle of our efforts to understand this crisis: no longer at the beginning, but not yet near the end.

Daniel Ellsberg
January 1, 1991

A Proposal: Manhattan Project II

The Cold War has just come to an end, and the nuclear era should end with it. But that is not happening, as of now. It is neither assured nor automatic. It will not come about without major changes in the present policies of our own nation, and others. And it will not happen without a focussed, coordinated effort of the highest priority.

The main precedent for that kind of effort in our own country was the one that launched the nuclear era, exactly half a century ago. That leads to a concrete proposal. The events of the late summer and fall of 1991 have created conditions that make 1992--the fiftieth anniversary of the organisation of the Manhattan Project--precisely the right time to create Manhattan Project II, on an equally urgent basis.

The task of the second Manhattan Project would be--so far as possible and as quickly as possible--to undo the legacy of the first: to free the earth of the threat of nuclear weapons.

With the ending of the Cold War, one phase of the nuclear epoch--the superpower arms race, with the possibility of crises posing a sizeable risk of eruption into an all-out global nuclear exchange--is coming to a close. But another phase, with its own, new dangers of limited nuclear wars and nuclear terrorism, may be about to begin: the era of nuclear proliferation.

The task of foreclosing this--and of reaping immediate possibilities of massive disarmament--should give a sense of urgency to a new Manhattan Project as great as inspired the original one fifty years ago. Then the time pressure came from the prospect of a German bomb. Now it is, in part, the prospect of bombs in the hands of a host of new countries, or even smaller groups.

For some of them, that deadline had recently come to seem no more than one to several years away, even before the breakup of the Soviet Union. UN inspections in Iraq last summer had revealed that their own secret efforts and a covert traffic in technology could have brought some nations--North Korea, Iran, Algeria, and Iraq, like Israel, India and Pakistan--much closer to a abomb capability than had been realized.

Now, suddenly, there is a possibility of a hemorrhaging abroad of nuclear technology, materials, perhaps finished weapons, almost certainly expertise, because of the potential erosion of centralized authority and discipline in the former Soviet nuclear complex. That could transform, within months, the environment of international decisionmaking on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear option might soon come to seem much more feasible--cheaper, easier, quicker, safer--than before, not only for countries that have already secretly pursuing it but for others who may consider coming into the race, including terrorist or other non-governmental groups.

Meanwhile, US policies continue to shape the international environment in ways that encourage proliferation: by selective tolerance for some national weapons programs; by continuing to insist on our right to threaten first-use, a danger particularly to non-nuclear states; by maintaining a massive arsenal and "modernizing" it, resisting deep cuts and continuing nuclear testing.

All these expressions of our own need and right to rely on nuclear weapons--despite our wealth and power, and in the absence now of any serious military threats to our national security--encourages potential nuclear states to look toward nuclear weapons as the US and its allies always have: as having vital, multiple uses as well as being unparalleled symbols of sovereignty and status.

To discourage others from following our own bad example, it will never be enough to try to close all technical access to proliferation. Manhattan Project II must also define and help bring about necessary changes in all these official US attitudes and policies.

There is a positive reason for urgency that is just as important. The ending of the Cold War, and the initial antinuclear allergy of the leaders and publics of the successor regimes to the Soviet Union, have created a totally unprecedented opportunity for collaboration by major nuclear states on achieving quick and radical reductions--in some cases, elimination--of their own nuclear arsenals, thus leading the way toward global nuclear disarmament.

Another motive, aside from urgency and importance, for the model of the Manhattan Project is the complexity and interdisciplinary nature of the task: reversing the course of vertical and horizontal proliferation and ending the nuclear era.

Just one facet of it--the technical scientific, engineering and logistical problems of dealing with radioactive waste from dismantled warheads and from the cleanup of the entire nuclear complex--calls for the coordinated talents of physicists, chemists, and other physical scientists and engineers on a scale comparable to the original project. (This would be a worthy basis for the conversion of the various national weapons labs, competing with the lure of covert weapons programs).

But devising practical solutions and programs for ridding the world of the danger of nuclear explosions and of most or all of its

nuclear weapons has far more varied dimensions to it than did the original problem of designing and producing such weapons, complex and interdisciplinary as that was. It calls as well for participants with insight and experience in policymaking, legislative politics, diplomacy, political psychology, military planning and institutions, and in general the process of social and political change.

In contrast to the original, the new Manhattan Project would be international and non-secretive. Ideally, it would be a high-priority project of governments from the start. But while the major republics of the former USSR seem now to share a commitment to the goal described above, that is not at all true of the present US Administration. Therefore such a project in the US would have to be organized outside government.

That means--regrettably, in view of the urgency--that while there is more than enough expertise outside government for the conceptual and planning phase of Manhattan Project II, the project would not be operational and managerial from the outset like the one fifty years ago. One of the major questions it would have to address would be how to bring about a societal understanding of and consensus on its goals.

To gain presidential and bureaucratic commitment to massive global nuclear disarmament and effective opposition to proliferation--including the kinds of US reciprocity that both of these will require--will take more, this time, than the equivalent of an Einstein-Szilard letter to FDR.

There is no time to lose.

[Compag]

C:\abol\thinking

July 7, 1994

Thinking About Nuclear Weapons

1. The use of nuclear weapons has never, for virtually anyone, been unthinkable: neither for "them" nor for "us."
2. A fortiori, the possession of nuclear weapons, or efforts to acquire them, have never been unthinkable.
3. It is not only second-use, retaliation (or threat of it: deterrence) that has customarily been seen as legitimate, thinkable, a desirable option. This was almost equally true of first-use at the onset of the nuclear era, confronting Nazi Germany and Japan.

There may have been some--unlike Szilard, Conant, FDR, et al--who totally rejected first-use even against Germany (as Szilard, Franck and 67 others did against Japan) or who would have rejected it if they had thought of it at all--but I have not specifically identified them, nor have explicit statements to this effect surfaced.

4. However, a great deal of lying, distortion, concealment and willfull blindness has supported the belief that first-use and first-strike are unthinkable, or at least have not been thought of, in any but the most overwhelmingly desperate circumstances (e.g., averting Nazi victory, achieving Japanese surrender (on such terms as we actually accepted) without an invasion, deterring or resisting Soviet invasion of Western Europe, preempting Soviet nuclear attack on the US).

In particular, this pattern of omission and deception supports the proposition that our leaders do not consider and find it unthinkable to initiate nuclear war, either centrally or regionally, in circumstances less exigent than these supposed cases. This has always been false, for virtually every one of our presidents since FDR.

5. A very high proportion of what passes for "thinking" about the uses of nuclear weapons is best described as wacko, fatheaded, inane, dumb, stupid, puerile, mad, crazy, or wishful. This despite the fact that some of the people doing this "thinking" are, in some spheres, exceptionally brilliant (e.g., in actually developing nuclear weapons) and in some cases, even knowledgeable about politics and bureaucracy and diplomacy (e.g., Kissinger, and for that matter, Nixon).

In the case of internal official thinking, this reflects in part the high sensitivity and secrecy of the subject--i.e., the fact that what is unreservedly thinkable for officials and their advisors is regarded as unthinkable by an important fraction of the

public (and perhaps, for their own wives)--which drastically limits the number of people in the discussion, often to a handful, the types of backgrounds and dispositions brought to bear, and the possibility of critical feedback. Yet even the relatively public discussions, as by Kissinger, Wohlstetter, Kahn and Schelling, show these same qualities of striking omission, neglect of logical or plausible extensions of the argument (Orwell's "doublethink") and at point idiocies, what C. Wright Mills called "crackpot realism."

6. This strain of nuttiness is apart from the issue of moral idiocy/inanity/murderousness that is exhibited in terms of values, aims, priorities, preferences, in lack of compassion or even empathy or concern for human life and suffering, and in lack of inhibitions or near-absolute constraints on risking or inflicted unprecedented, possibly near-absolute devastation. (See James Newman's intemperate characterization of Kahn's "On Thermonuclear War." I recall it to this day: "This evil and tenebrous book, with its looselipped pieties and its hayfoot-strawfoot logic, exudes a bloodthirsty irrationality such as I have not encountered in my years of reading.")

7. Why? Is there something about the Bomb that is prejudicial to reasonable thinking: a kind of force-field around it--or around the notion of it--that bends the thought patterns of otherwise clearheaded men? (It is women, not men, who tend of regard use of the bomb as unthinkable. Not all women, either).

8. This long, fifty-year pattern of bad thinking about the bomb is all too likely to persist in the minds of officials and analysts in nations considering newly acquiring the bomb, as acquisition gets cheaper and easier. And just as was true for their predecessors, this warped thought is likely to support the notion that first-use of the weapon is thinkable, not merely possession or deterrence.

Thus, it is important to realize that this was true even for someone as brilliant and prescient as Szilard, one who was able, even under the pressures of World War II, to reject the plan for first-use against Japan, in contrast to Germany.

[Compag]

C:\abol\thinking
July 7, 1994

Thinking About Nuclear Weapons

1. The use of nuclear weapons has never, for virtually anyone, been unthinkable: neither for "them" nor for "us."
2. A fortiori, the possession of nuclear weapons, or efforts to acquire them, have never been unthinkable.
3. It is not only second-use, retaliation (or threat of it: deterrence) that has customarily been seen as legitimate, thinkable, a desirable option. This was almost equally true of first-use at the onset of the nuclear era, confronting Nazi Germany and Japan.

There may have been some--unlike Szilard, Conant, FDR, et al--who totally rejected first-use even against Germany (as Szilard, Franck and 67 others did against Japan) or who would have rejected it if they had thought of it at all--but I have not specifically identified them, nor have explicit statements to this effect surfaced.

4. However, a great deal of lying, distortion, concealment and willfull blindness has supported the belief that first-use and first-strike are unthinkable, or at least have not been thought of, in any but the most overwhelmingly desperate circumstances (e.g., averting Nazi victory, achieving Japanese surrender (on such terms as we actually accepted) without an invasion, deterring or resisting Soviet invasion of Western Europe, preempting Soviet nuclear attack on the US).

In particular, this pattern of omission and deception supports the proposition that our leaders do not consider and find it unthinkable to initiate nuclear war, either centrally or regionally, in circumstances less exigent than these supposed cases. This has always been false, for virtually every one of our presidents since FDR.

5. A very high proportion of what passes for "thinking" about the uses of nuclear weapons is best described as wacko, fatheaded, inane, dumb, stupid, puerile, mad, crazy, or wishful. This despite the fact that some of the people doing this "thinking" are, in some spheres, exceptionally brilliant (e.g., in actually developing nuclear weapons) and in some cases, even knowledgeable about politics and bureaucracy and diplomacy (e.g., Kissinger, and for that matter, Nixon).

In the case of internal official thinking, this reflects in part the high sensitivity and secrecy of the subject--i.e., the fact that what is unreservedly thinkable for officials and their advisors is regarded as unthinkable by an important fraction of the

public (and perhaps, for their own wives)--which drastically limits the number of people in the discussion, often to a handful, the types of backgrounds and dispositions brought to bear, and the possibility of critical feedback. Yet even the relatively public discussions, as by Kissinger, Wohlstetter, Kahn and Schelling, show these same qualities of striking omission, neglect of logical or plausible extensions of the argument (Orwell's "doublethink") and at point idiocies, what C. Wright Mills called "crackpot realism."

6. This strain of nuttiness is apart from the issue of moral idiocy/inanity/murderousness that is exhibited in terms of values, aims, priorities, preferences, in lack of compassion or even empathy or concern for human life and suffering, and in lack of inhibitions or near-absolute constraints on risking or inflicted unprecedented, possibly near-absolute devastation. (See James Newman's intemperate characterization of Kahn's "On Thermonuclear War." I recall it to this day: "This evil and tenebrous book, with its looselipped pieties and its hayfoot-strawfoot logic, exudes a bloodthirsty irrationality such as I have not encountered in my years of reading.")

7. Why? Is there something about the Bomb that is prejudicial to reasonable thinking: a kind of force-field around it--or around the notion of it--that bends the thought patterns of otherwise clearheaded men? (It is women, not men, who tend of regard use of the bomb as unthinkable. Not all women, either).

8. This long, fifty-year pattern of bad thinking about the bomb is all too likely to persist in the minds of officials and analysts in nations considering newly acquiring the bomb, as acquisition gets cheaper and easier. And just as was true for their predecessors, this warped thought is likely to support the notion that first-use of the weapon is thinkable, not merely possession or deterrence.

Thus, it is important to realize that this was true even for someone as brilliant and prescient as Szilard, one who was able, even under the pressures of World War II, to reject the plan for first-use against Japan, in contrast to Germany.

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July 10, 94

"Where are we heading? How much time do we have? How do you measure this? What do these questions mean to you?"
(Note June 1979: during Rocky Flats trial?)

Why has the US arms buildup proceeded as it has: as long, as large, on CF weapons; and why have efforts to change it failed?

List of neglected considerations (neglected at Student Pugwash? Notes on Jeff Dunham. This must have been when I met Erik Markusen. In San Diego?) Such as: FU threats, link to FS threats, etc. see file. (Reasons for arms race: neglected factors).

May be worth recalling/analyzing the motivations that led to US/Soviet first-strike arms race, because: 1) it could be reproduced with Russia; 2) it could be reproduced regionally; 3) it reveals the sorts of "human" political motivations that are part of the global situation/predicament, which make possession of nuclear weapons (by anyone) so dangerous, along with the preservation of the institution of war.

See the realities vs. the myths of nuclear weapons, the ways they did and didn't make a difference. E.g.: marginal difference that just a few A bombs made to strategic bombing capability (and no difference at all to moral considerations); ability to keep a superiority (predicted, and actual); motives in CW and relation of nucs...

In my time I have opposed the dangers of nuclear weapons in a number of ways: war planning; crisis studies; trying to end war in VN before...; exposure of FU threats; civil disobedience--trying to build movement of NVR;

imagine : "My trial as a war criminal"--like Szilard's (see). Judging what I did do, what I could/should have done, what my obligations were...

Use nec def approach: explain:

(fictionalize trial?) see my Rocky Flats defense, 1979

What if, parallel to my trial in 1971-73, I had simultaneously been tried--either by Federal Court, or by "People's Tribunal" (as was proposed for me in June of 1971, by Drinnon! See) or by congressional hearing--for my actual participation in the war and in nuclear war planning, 1959-68-69!

Consider my possible defenses in my actual trial: The one used, which seemed to acknowledge that the laws applied could be used as an Official Secrets Act, but simply didn't apply in my case; or a Nec Def/ or Nuremberg Defense; or a Nimmer defense, denying that these laws could be used for this purpose!

Gofman: t RF trial: Past nuclear tests have condemned one million people in Northern Hemisphere to die by lung cancer: 116,000 in the US (over 30-50 years)

(See Goffman; "this is what has to be justified, by the need defense of the DOE"; compare to tobacco, and to current defenses by tobacco executives. (If tobacco can be regulated/banned, made accountable; then anything is possible; same for nucs). (except "national security." Did nuc arms race really serve this? Not in a way that officials were willing to see debated fairly!)

Note from Sept. 7

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June 14, 1995

What is the truth? Tell the truth.

Good questions, advice, in this 50th year of the nuclear era; this last month of MP-II at PSR in Washington.

I couldn't tell what I was learning about war plans, in 1958-59, to almost anyone.

I couldn't tell what I really thought about what I was learning. Not to the Air Force, the JCS. Not, fully, to virtually anyone. (hsr?)

I had to be very: operational; an operator; instrumental; rational; pragmatic; effective. And maintain access, effectiveness. (Recall Jim Thomson's Effectiveness Trap). Frame my questions, my recommendations, that way. (Recall AJW on destroying cities; and Enthoven).

My feeling of loyalty to McN, based on lunch...

My sense that I was in a cabal, a conspiracy, with hsr, with McN (AE,) Gilpatric...to change these mad, evil plans, to move the system away from the slope to the abyss, to ease shut the door to hell that I had opened unsuspectingly...

Consider the situation we are still in, the realism of Crimson Tide (as, Dr. Strangelove).

Headline in the Washington Post, Wednesday, June 14, 1995: House Sustains B-2 Funds, Blocks Aid to Destroy Soviet Nuclear Arms.

The House voted to keep a half billion dollars in the budget to keep the B-2 production line going and "allow for procurement beyond the 20 planes the Administration had sought." (A substantial majority--not all--of Republicans joined more than 70 Democrats, "particularly from B-2 production states such as California and New York" to support additional planes.

"The advocates of additional B-2's challenged the administration's bomber strategy, saying the B-2 remains the most cost-effective means of projecting force..."This is not about the budget...This is about the defense of our nation and the safety and security of our children for years to come," declared Majority Leader Richard D. Armey...

Meanwhile, 244-180 the House supported a Dornan amendment "to hold up all spending under the Nunn-Lugar program to finance dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons by Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (which had already been reduced under the proposed

bill from the administration request for \$371 million to \$171 million. "Dornan contended that continued Russian work on biological weapons poses a serious threat to the US and requires withholding of all the US aid" [unless the President certifies that the Russia work on bio weapons has stopped; which he cannot do; a killer requirement]. Despite support by Perry, "who has argued that the funds have succeeded in removing 2800 nuclear warheads so far from the former Soviet states."

Clinton wants a third Seawolf sub--\$2.4 billion--, but Repubs refuse it, want to cancel it. The defense authorisation bill calls for a \$267.3 billion military budget, \$9.7 billion more than the Pentagon budget requested by the White House...including accelerated development of ballistic missile defenses...

(Thus: more money to destroy Russian missiles in silos by B-2s, or to destroy them in flight, but less money to remove them from silos by arms control, even when this dismantlement has already been negotiated and requires no price in further US reductions...)

"The bill also would cut funds from what Republicans consider nondefense areas, such as cleaning up toxic waste at military facilities, ...

[This is as close to psychotically insane as it is possible for policy to be. Culp agreed today (we had a sandwich after I spoke at a rally in front of the White House protesting the French announcement yesterday and today that they will conduct 8 more nuclear tests starting in September. Chirac, who was lunching with Clinton at the French Embassy while we were demonstrating and marching in front of the White House, said the decision was "irrevocable." I suggested that Clinton tell him: "Jacques, that doesn't translate too well. Let's reformulate it: It's over. The nuclear era is over. No more testing. Zero. Nada.")]

Culp agreed, as I was saying, that the control of Russian warheads and fissile material was the number one problem in the world; and that our complacency and neglect with regard to this would be looked back on as one of the most stupid and reckless episodes in human history...

[IPPNW: Make vivid the human dimensions of one 1 KT terrorist bomb, in various cities. Or one "small" regional nuclear war. Alongside the policies necessary to minimize the likelihood of these (to various degrees). Like "ground zero" symposia of early '80's. Paul Walker had been in charge!]

Insanity. The Nuclear Era: A Chronicle of Madness. Never, remotely, faced, for a moment, anywhere. (Even Japan). Compare Rwanda, Bosnia, Beirut...with our nuclear planning. ("Just like

the Polish plans...") And preparations. and alerting. And current budgeting. (And presumptions about preemption--"counterterrorism"! straight out of Ash Carter's office! in Crimson Tide.

Imagine laying out for the CISSM seminar, just how rational this "rationality of irrationality," these madman theories, have been and are. The unquestioned necessity for them. As Halberstam says about the premises that led to Vietnam (in his review of McNamara's book): These rational analysts were operating on the basis of wildly irrational beliefs; which they really knew; but they didn't have the courage to pay the political capital, or take the political risks, to challenge them publicly; to say, "The Emperor Has No Clothes" (McNamara's slogan); to make the effort, take the chance, to do what was necessary to reeducate the American Congress, media, public...and the other nuclear states, and the world. To implement Operation Candor, at last. (Like Hazel O'Leary, about the the DOE. Discuss this with O'Leary? Or, first, with Luongo. von Hippel. who else? Is interested in telling the truth, not just to the President, but to the world? Make this a basis for a grant, the program? Or more modestly: My own Operation Candor (reflectingt Gilpatric interview and report; and my video tapes, Penn video), financed by McArthur research and writing grant, and/or Guggenheim? Wade Greene/ Rockefeller-Halprin? (What of their interest in telling the truth; Lee's and Abby's notes...)

\hist\ (and\auto\)mynucsto.ry
August 25, 1995

Plan for fall writing:

Nearly everything written about the role of nuclear weapons, deterrence, plans, etc. has been nonsense, and largely irrelevant: as badly misdirected as most accounts of the Hiroshima "decision."

That's because, in part, none of these writers have had the particular experience and information that I had: precisely at a time when the US had a near-monopoly of strategic force. And my experience spanned the period when the US did not know--or pretended not to know--that it had such a monopoly, and the succeeding period when the President knew this very well, but in no appropriate way acted on this information. (Nor did anyone else, including me).

I was just saying to Patricia: even now, no one writing about these subjects would share my perspective...except for those actually working on war plans and operations. "And people who get access to these plans don't see anything wrong with them...don't see how crazy they are."

Having said that, the question occurred to me: Why is this? After all, some of these people--Walt Slocum, others--are very intelligent? Why can't they see that strategies that seemed appropriate to me in a very different period and context became obviously insane in the world as it evolved just a few years later?

An answer occurred to me, for the first time: all those people were introduced to the plans in a period when the Soviets, imitating us after 1964, had built up their force to the same crazy levels as ours, and were imitating our counterforce capabilities. Nor were they tempted to believe that the Brezhnev buildup and posture could be easily stopped or reversed. So they were looking at a force that seemed to rationalise our own and our plans, despite the joint craziness of the programs (as in Prisoner's Dilemma?).

I, on the other hand, began by seeing the "balance" as it actually later became, i.e., as if the world Slocum et al confronted had already existed in 1958-61. That is why these strategies seemed relevant, though desperate and obviously dangerous, to me at the time, and to all my colleagues. (The meaning of these strategies was different to Air Force officers who had a better knowledge of Soviet weakness and vulnerability; they understood that these plans were oriented to first-strike, not to deterrence of nuclear attack).

But in September 1961 I became aware--long before any of my RAND colleagues--that the real world was entirely different from

what we had been told and believed. The difference was as great as the world of Europe and the Warsaw Pact before 1989-91 and after. It was like two different planets.

And did I suggest then that we should reexamine all our assumptions, concepts, plans, in light of this new world? The possibilities for a test ban, for radical arms control? No, I did not; nor did any other official or consultant.

My own first reaction was: How does this bear on our immediate crisis, the Berlin Crisis? Khrushchev was threatening to turn over access to Berlin to East Germany in December, just two months away. He had no missiles at all! (to be precise, four). He couldn't possibly face down the US; he was bluffing! (He had clearly been lying to us and the world about his ICBM production). So I embarked on a campaign to call his bluff. And I eventually succeeded in doing so; and two days after Gilpatric delivered my speech exposing the true missile gap in our favor, Khrushchev dropped his commitment to signing a peace treaty with East Germany that year. The Berlin Crisis was over. My speech had ended it.

As I told Patricia: I felt pretty good about that. Unfortunately--I didn't know it till years later--my speech, exposing his bluff and humiliating him, as well as revealing the strategic consequences of the missile imbalance, impelled Khrushchev to try to even the playing field as fast as he could. The only way he could do that quickly was by secretly transporting some intermediate and medium range missiles to within range of the US: in Cuba.

[Burlesque routine: "That's bad."

"No, that was good; we won a great victory in the Cuban Crisis."

"That's good."

"No, that was bad. Partly as a result of this humiliation, Khrushchev was replaced by Brezhnev, who promised the military, for their support, that they would never be in that position again; that led to a twenty-five year nuclear buildup in the SU, and thus on both sides."

"That's bad."

"No, that was good [according to Reagan]. It bankrupted the Soviet Union and led to the ending to the ending of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Empire and the downfall of Communism."

"That's good."

"No, that was bad. Now we have war in former Yugoslavia, we

may have civil war in Russia, and the Mafia running Russia may allow nuclear weapons to leak out to all sides. And a fascist government in Russia will continue to have enough nuclear weapons to destroy life on earth, as will we."

"That's bad."

"Yes, that's bad."]

But by late October, the Berlin Crisis appeared to be over. Why didn't we--why didn't I, why didn't anyone--say then: OK, now let's look at everything anew, from the bottom? (A "Bottom Up Review"). Maybe we have totally underrated the possibilities of far-reaching arms control, nuclear disarmament! Is there some way we could keep the Soviets down to four ICBMs, or even get those dismantled? After all, Khrushchev has only built four,, after all, without any agreement limiting ours. Isn't it possible that an agreement limiting ours as well could keep a lid on his, or even eliminate them?

Why isn't a test ban feasible? And a test ban on missile tests!

Yet as Ray Garthoff has reported--about a group, for which he was the rapporteur, assigned to assess the significance of the new intelligence for our strategic programs--the only question they looked at was: In the light of these new findings, are our programs adequate?

Needless to say, our programs projecting a minimum of 1000 Minutemen looked "adequate." How could they have looked otherwise? Why did this question need to be addressed at all?!

Yet that was really the only question they looked at. Not: might our programs be a little excessive? They have four, we need 1000? How could that have made sense to anyone?

Pat: Well, that's the US reaction to the new situation, now. Sure: and for basically the same reasons: we don't want to give up the "superiority" (in this case, to the rest of the world), or the force structure, or the jobs, production, profits. JFK wanted to build 1000 missiles starting in the fall of 1961, for domestic economic reasons.

"He wouldn't give it up for the world." (As Mort Sahl quoted Ike as saying about letting John Foster Dulles go. Sahl's comment: "At least he knows what the stakes are.")

But then I thought of another new question, and a new answer. How could Tom Schelling and Mort Halperin, who were just initiating the analytical field of arms control, have failed to see these possibilities? Answer: They didn't know, in vivid, precise,

concrete terms, the extent of the shift in "reality." They didn't know the new estimates, or how reliably they were based. Like my listeners at my RAND briefing, even if they had been told the new estimate they probably wouldn't have believed it, or at least, really absorbed it. Like RAND, they went on living in the old world for several years--till it had changed decisively, to become more like the former, illusory perception.

(Recall that RAND thinking, in particular, had become frozen, as in amber, at the 1958 estimate of the missile gap, the last one they saw. In 1959 and 1960 and 1961, as the estimates began presenting dissenting footnotes, RAND perceptions still reflected the 1958 estimates of the impending gap, the largest gaps of all.)

[Note that people at different clearance levels live in different realities, different worlds of information. Thus, histories of the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the arms race [me versus nearly everyone else]; even JFK's outdated perceptions just before the Cuban Missile Crisis.]

Even people who learned, at one point or another, that there was no missile gap favoring the Soviets, but were led to believe--as was generally true for 10-20 years (and Rhodes said it again this year)--that the Soviets had "only 50" ICBMs in 1961, did not at all grasp the nature of the changed perception of reality.

A belief that the Russians had 50 missiles would not have raised any questions about the premises of our worldview or about the nature of Soviet aims and the possibilities of negotiation. That would have suggested that no fundamental changes were called for in our conceptual framework. The Soviets had simply been less successful in pursuing their goals than our worst-case conjectures had projected. So Halperin and Schelling (check this with them) would not have been led to imagine wholly different possibilities for concerting US-SU programs that were conceivable in 1959.

As for what I could have done: in reflecting on what McNamara should have done when he realized, no later than 1965 or 66, that his earlier hopes were unfounded, I realized this summer: I could have put out the war plans.

To be sure, that never occurred to me. I did imagine informing Congress, but since it was in the grip of Richard Russell, Strom Thurmond and such types, there didn't seem any promise in that. And the New York Times would not have been quick to print such things in 1961; in fact, they almost surely would not have done so.

And--Pat points out--I would certainly have gone to prison. She says: "You probably would have been executed." No: I could probably have done it in a way that would have avoided a conviction for treason (?). Anyway, we weren't at war. But prison, yes. The

stakes looked as high to me, even then, as in Vietnam; in fact, obviously higher. I could have done it, if I had thought of it and if I could have found a way to get them out effectively. I think they would have made a major difference.

Pat: that's a heavy load to bear. Yes: but the same as with Vietnam, what I could have done in 1964-65. I just didn't think of it (unlike Rabinowitch, in 1945; and he had little reason to imagine that he would have made a difference, though in fact he might have--via the Japanese, who were more ready to sue for peace than he knew).

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September 5, 1995

Thoughts:

mass murder mystery

How to present it:

As something which has happened; being investigated

As a vision of the future, a foretelling, a psychic's reading

As something going on, which presents a clear picture of a crime in the making; a Hitchcock suspense drama; in the pattern of past crimes, by same people or similar

Thus, a suspense story; with clues, false clues, "coincidences", false and real (like Graham Green "entertainment"; a spy story; a war story;

An "accident waiting to happen"; but in this case, not necessarily an "accident" (though it might be) but a (mass) murder, a mass homicide, suicide, negligent homicide...

A man gets into a car "dead" drunk, to drive home, partly on a freeway...

A child play, unknowing, near a piece of deadly machinery, an abyss... ("The Trail of the Lonesome Pine," a child takes the wheel of a locomotive...

A terrorist wires up a car, but the wrong person gets in; or the target is accompanied by an "innocent" (Letelier; Scarface; ...

Mystery: mystory: the "ACCIDENT"...why? what is my responsibility...how do I make amends, "pay my dues" ("I paid my dues earlier, did I not?" Monkey's Paw. "...I've done my time in hell." What was the responsibility/causal role of: Mother; Dad (Gloria?!)

Hiroshima:

Present the official story; and the circumstantial case in favor of it. (Very strong: like the case against OJ Simpson!) ("Trout in the milk": Emerson)

Then, take each element and show the "context" unknown to the

public (hidden and lied about, known to the top officials): hidden factors, secret knowledge, ignored events:

In effect, a defense case that exonerates OJ Simpson; he didn't do it, couldn't have done it; simultaneously an alibi (which might not identify actual killers or their motives), and an explanation of why the circumstantial case was so (misleadingly) strong. (Partly coincidental; partly constructed, by either killers and associates or by others interested in a cover-up (JFK assassination). And perhaps an identification of the actual killers, and/or their motives.

As in: Peter Dale Scott's "deconstruction" of the official story of the JFK Assassination, the case against Oswald as the lone killer: very strong, though somewhat implausible (too "lucky," no motive, very difficult for one person; as in OJ's case, a celebrity generally known as "sweet-tempered"). (Hiroshima: not implausible at all, though a surprisingly quick reaction to an unprecedented event).

In JFK case: "facts that can't be explained by the official story. Evidence of cover-up, lies, omissions. Search for a motive (still); candidates (not in official account). Identity of other killers still unknown, though strong evidence of "interests" directing them, including identifiable "bosses".

Thus, the case for the propositions that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (A) caused the Japanese to surrender unconditionally (B); and that the main or only motive for the President to order A was to produce the effect B:

- (1) A follows B, very quickly;
- (2) B (surrender) was previously seen (by public, and allegedly by officials) as almost impossible;
- (3) concrete evidence for its unlikelihood (possibility of A not being known to public): suicidal defense of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, declarations by Japanese, preparations in Japan;
- (4) evidence that officials regarded it as unlikely (without A, or invasion): scale and term of US preparations for invasion
- (5) no other events (in public's awareness)--prior to A, simultaneous, or intervening (between A and B)--that could account for B;
- (6) only known motive for A is B; thus, B supports official declaration that the purpose of A was (only) to produce B--i.e., officials had a (plausible) causal theory that A would or might cause B, supported by actual events.

(7) no evidence that officials had any alternative way to produce B (prior to invasion), or foresaw any events that would cause or support B (as evidence that officials' "use" of A was justified). (Thus, as evidence for "A caused B": officials' prior belief, based on their superior knowledge, and not contradicted by events, that A--and A alone, prior to invasion--would, or could/might cause B (not necessarily as quickly as B actually followed A).

(8) ("Expert" witnesses and character witnesses): Both propositions have been accepted for 50 years by the great majority of the American people; they were declared by our highest authorities, the very officials who took the acts (hmmm); they were endorsed without challenge for 20 years by all historians, and by those most widely-read (e.g., Manchester, McCulloch) since then.

(9) Almost any other explanation of motive has the potential of indicting our respected wartime leaders and those who followed some of their orders of mass murder, and subsequent cover-up; and accusing two generations of American opinion-leaders and public of being dupes and fools.

[To try to change people's minds on all this in a brief time is like, as Chomsky has put it, like speaking in a foreign language. Or contradicting that the Earth is round or that water freezes.

Note a comparable explanation for the ending of the Cold War: it was brought about by Reagan's military budgets.

Stimson/Truman explanation of Hiroshima: a great example of successful "spin." "Framing."

The OJ Simpson trial is not a very helpful analogy, after all. In that case, the circumstantial case for murder is not only very strong; it is almost surely correct. My earlier metaphor requires thinking of it as misleading--like the circumstantial case that the massacre at Hiroshima was not murder but "justified homicide," as by a policeman of an armed suspect who was shooting at him or others. It requires imagining that there is, in fact, a valid alternative explanation for each of the circumstantial elements that point to guilt: i.e., one of the Cochran defense theories. The analogy is offensive, as well as counter-factual, since it suggests that the Simpson defense team could be correct.

[Incidentally, Fuhrman's interview does suggest a significant possibility, not that Simpson is innocent, but that the prosecution case against him may have been deliberately hyped up, constructed, so as to facilitate the prosecution of a very popular celebrity.]

Another issue: Was it (mass) murder, or self-defense? Or negligent homicide? Or intended, but misguided, misled

(unnecessary, or against wrong parties) self-defense? Or intended self-defense, but by illegitimate means, or means too dangerous to "innocent" parties? In other words: What is the charge, or defense?

See possibility of plea-bargaining; copping a plea.

See Menendez brothers: known killers, but question of motive; they say self-defense; but they had a clear interest in murder (inheritance).

Issue: on role of Truman.

Compare role of Janet Reno in WACO: mass murder, negligent homicide, accidental deaths, self-defense? (avoidance of invasion! versus long blockade; or negotiation! Cf Randy Weaver (his wife killed; MOVE in Philadelphia.

Reno only two months (weeks?) on job; dependent on (bad) advisors and experts; revenge-minded DATA (?) after initial deaths from initial attempt at entry; ambiguity in whether leader was willing to surrender, or was stalling; followers ready to die on leader's decision; intercepted communications.

Or, JFK in Bay of Pigs: secret operation underway when he comes into office; deadline only three months into his term; experts, inexperienced advisors; he could have cancelled, but at risk being denounced by those preparing operation and by outsiders. (Did anyone--besides Fulbright--really argue against it, strongly?

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September 5, 1995

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*(A voyage
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In effect, a defense case that exonerates OJ Simpson; he didn't do it, couldn't have done it; simultaneously an alibi (which might not identify actual killers or their motives), and an explanation of why the circumstantial case was so (misleadingly) strong. (Partly coincidental; partly constructed, by either killers and associates or by others interested in a cover-up (JFK assassination). And perhaps an identification of the actual killers, and/or their motives. ^{= defense of not to white US citizens to a black jury}

As in: Peter Dale Scott's "deconstruction" of the official story of the JFK Assassination, the case against Oswald as the lone killer: very strong, though somewhat implausible (too "lucky," no motive, very difficult for one person; as in OJ's case, a celebrity generally known as "sweet-tempered"). (Hiroshima: not implausible at all, though a surprisingly quick reaction to an unprecedented event).

In JFK case: "facts that can't be explained by the official story. Evidence of cover-up, lies, omissions. Search for a motive (still); candidates (not in official account). Identity of other killers still unknown, though strong evidence of "interests" directing them, including identifiable "bosses".

Thus, the case for the propositions that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (A) caused the Japanese to surrender unconditionally (B); and that the main or only motive for the President to order A was to produce the effect B:

(1) ^B follows ^A, very quickly;

(2) B (surrender) was previously seen (by public, and allegedly by officials) as almost impossible;

(3) concrete evidence for its unlikelihood (possibility of A not being known to public): suicidal defense of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, declarations by Japanese, preparations in Japan; ^{without B}

(4) evidence that officials regarded it as unlikely (without A, or invasion): scale and term of US preparations for invasion

(5) no other events (in public's awareness)--prior to A, simultaneous, or intervening (between A and B)--that could account for B;

(6) only known motive for A is B; thus, B supports official declaration that the purpose of A was (only) to produce B--i.e., officials had a (plausible) causal theory that A would or might cause B, supported by actual events.

(7) no evidence that officials had any alternative way to produce B (prior to invasion), or foresaw any events that would cause or support B (as evidence that officials' "use" of A was justified). (Thus, as evidence for "A caused B": officials' prior belief, based on their superior knowledge, and not contradicted by events, that A--and A alone, prior to invasion--would, or could/might cause B (not necessarily as quickly as B actually followed A).

(8) ("Expert" witnesses and character witnesses): Both propositions have been accepted for 50 years by the great majority of the American people; they were declared by our highest authorities, the very officials who took the acts (hmmm); they were endorsed without challenge for 20 years by all historians, and by those most widely-read (e.g., Manchester, McCulloch) since then.

(9) Almost any other explanation of motive has the potential of indicting our respected wartime leaders and those who followed some of their orders of mass murder, and subsequent cover-up; and accusing two generations of American opinion-leaders and public of being dupes and fools.

[To try to change people's minds on all this in a brief time is like, as Chomsky has put it, like speaking in a foreign language. Or contradicting that the Earth is round or that water freezes.

Note a comparable explanation for the ending of the Cold War: it was brought about by Reagan's military budgets.

Stimson/Truman explanation of Hiroshima: a great example of successful "spin." "Framing."

The OJ Simpson trial is not a very helpful analogy, after all. In that case, the circumstantial case for murder is not only very strong; it is almost surely correct. My earlier metaphor requires thinking of it as misleading--like the circumstantial case that the massacre at Hiroshima was not murder but "justified homicide," as by a policeman of an armed suspect who was shooting at him or others. It requires imagining that there is, in fact, a valid alternative explanation for each of the circumstantial elements that point to guilt: i.e., one of the Cochran defense theories. The analogy is offensive, as well as counter-factual, since it suggests that the Simpson defense team could be correct.

[Incidentally, Fuhrman's interview does suggest a significant possibility, not that Simpson is innocent, but that the prosecution case against him may have been deliberately hyped up, constructed, so as to facilitate the prosecution of a very popular celebrity.]

Another issue: Was it (mass) murder, or self-defense? Or negligent homicide? Or intended, but misguided, misled

(unnecessary, or against wrong parties) self-defense? Or intended self-defense, but by illegitimate means, or means too dangerous to "innocent" parties? In other words: What is the charge, or defense?

See possibility of plea-bargaining; copping a plea.

See Menendez brothers: known killers, but question of motive; they say self-defense; but they had a clear interest in murder (inheritance).

Issue: on role of Truman.

Compare role of Janet Reno in WACO: mass murder, negligent homicide, accidental deaths, self-defense? (avoidance of invasion! versus long blockade; or negotiation! Cf Randy Weaver (his wife killed; MOVE in Philadelphia.

Reno only two months (weeks?) on job; dependent on (bad) advisors and experts; revenge-minded DATA (?) after initial deaths from initial attempt at entry; ambiguity in whether leader was willing to surrender, or was stalling; followers ready to die on leader's decision; intercepted communications.

Or, JFK in Bay of Pigs: secret operation underway when he comes into office; deadline only three months into his term; experts, inexperienced advisors; he could have cancelled, but at risk being denounced by those preparing operation and by outsiders. (Did anyone--besides Fulbright--really argue against it, strongly?

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29 November, 1995, 11:15 PM

In 1961 I wrote the first Kennedy Administration guidance for the general nuclear war plans. To be exact: I drafted the Secretary of Defense guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on which they were to base their annual operating plan for the conduct of general nuclear war.

I wrote this draft guidance, on the request of my friend and former RAND colleague Harry Rowen, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense under Paul Nitze, with no other directive to me than, "Write what you think the guidance should be." Eventually Robert McNamara approved, signed and transmitted what I had written, without change or addition, as his official, Top Secret guidance to the JCS.

This guidance, which was a drastic, thorough revision of the Eisenhower-era strategic war plans, shaped the subsequent plans for nuclear war throughout the Sixties, and to a significant degree, up to the present.

I mentioned once to a friend that I finished my first draft of that guidance on my 30th birthday. His uncharitable reaction was: "That's frightening."

"True. But you should have seen the plan I was replacing."

That last Eisenhower plan--the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)--called for a US nuclear first strike under a wide variety of possible circumstances. Not for a preventive war, or a surprise attack, out of the blue, but an all-out attack designed to destroy the "Sino-Soviet Bloc"--its cities along with its nuclear and other military forces--in many possible contingencies other than a prior nuclear attack by the Soviet Union or its allies.

[in particular, NATO planning...but also...]

[this is probably not the right way to proceed: trying to draft finished text. Probably I should start as I would for a lecture: rough notes toward an outline, of topics I want to cover--preferably, or eventually, in an order...and then, write as I would give the lecture. At my best. I.e., with some structure, not totally rambling. Perhaps the way to deal with rambling--which I should try to suppress when I do give a lecture--is to dump excursions in a second file: conceivably, numbering them as end-notes; or rather, writing some end-notes, but putting unrelated thoughts, real rambles, in a second file, perhaps putting an

identifying number in parentheses.

]

12:10 AM: I have written one hour. No, five minutes to go. OK: what's next. Based on my talk at the press conference for the start of the Fast for Abolition at the NPT {GET}...

My question to the JCS, sent by JFK, on the estimated casualties. [I later asked this to HAK, on the eve of the invasion of Laos. I am thinking of addressing it to Tony Lake at the CFR when he discusses Bosnia next week, on December 6. "What is your best estimate--just a rough range, a guess--on the number of Americans who will be killed or injured next year in Bosnia, and the number they will kill?" Should not the American people and Congress have the benefit, as we go in, of knowing the best estimates that have been generated within the Executive?

And: if US troops are attacked by what are essentially guerrillas or civilians in Bosnia, what is the "fire" we are going to fight that with, and what does "and then some" mean? (In Clinton's assertion last night: We will fight fire with fire, and then some.")

12:15